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DO FINANCIAL STATEMENT ADJUSTMENTS MATTER IN CREDIT ANALYSIS? 
Evidence from the Global Telecommunications Industry 
 
 
Research Objectives This thesis investigates whether financial statement adjustments 
made during the rating process matter in credit analysis. Firstly, 
the thesis investigates whether reporting standards and company-
specific factors are associated with financial statement 
adjustments. Secondly, the thesis examines whether financial 
statement adjustments are associated with actual credit ratings. 
  
Data   The data used in the analyses is provided by one of the largest 
credit rating agencies, referred to as Credit Rating Agency X. The 
main data consists of the time period 2004-2007, including 196 
companies reporting under US GAAP, IFRS and local GAAPs. 
Moreover, the IFRS companies included in the main data are 
analyzed more thoroughly in terms of the adjustment type, using 
the second set of data from year 2007. The data only includes 
companies active in the telecommunications industry. 
 
Empirical Analysis The first part of the empirical analyses aims at explaining financial 
statement adjustments using a linear regression method. The 
second part, on the other hand, includes credit rating models 
estimated also with a linear regression method. The adjustment 
variables are added one at a time in the rating models in order to 
investigate the association between financial statement adjustments 
and ratings. In an additional test, the explanatory powers resulting 
from reported and adjusted data are compared. 
 
Results   First, the evidence suggests that capital intensity, operative risk 
and leverage are important in explaining financial statement 
adjustments. Additionally, public companies face fewer 
adjustments relative to private companies. The ultimate underlying 
reason for financial statement adjustments seems to be company-
specific decisions concerning financing and capital structure as 
well as contractual matters. Second, the evidence demonstrates 
that, without any adjustments, credit ratings are higher for 
companies reporting under IFRS relative to companies reporting 
under US GAAP. However, adjustments increase ratings for US 
companies. On the other hand, local GAAP adjustments decrease 
rating relative to US GAAP. The results indicate that financial 
statement adjustments do matter in credit analysis. 
 
Key Words  Financial statement adjustments, quality of financial statement 
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ONKO TILINPÄÄTÖSOIKAISUILLA MERKITYSTÄ LUOTTOANALYYSISSÄ? 
Tutkimustuloksia telekommunikaatiotoimialalta 
 
 
Tutkimuksen tavoitteet Tutkielman tavoitteena on selvittää, onko tilinpäätösoikaisuilla 
merkitystä luottoanalyysissä. Ensimmäiseksi tutkielma tarkastelee, 
ovatko tilinpäätösstandardit ja yrityskohtaiset tekijät yhteydessä 
tilinpäätösoikaisujen määrän kanssa. Toiseksi tutkielma käsittelee 
sitä, ovatko tilinpäätösoikaisut yhteydessä todellisiin 
luottoluokituksiin. 
 
Lähdeaineisto Kansainvälinen lähdeaineisto on saatu eräältä 
luottoluokitusyritykseltä, johon viitataan tutkimuksessa nimellä 
Luottoluokitusyritys X. Pääaineisto koostuu vuosilta 2004–2007 
yhteensä 196 telekommunikaatiotoimialan yrityksestä, jotka 
raportoivat tilinpäätöksensä US GAAP, IFRS ja kansallisten 
tilinpäätösstandardien mukaan. Lisäksi pääaineistoon kuuluvien 
IFRS-yritysten oikaisutyyppejä analysoidaan tarkemmin käyttäen 
aineistoa vuodelta 2007. 
 
Aineiston käsittely Empirian ensimmäisessä osassa tilinpäätösoikaisujen määrää 
selitetään lineaarisen regressiomenetelmän avulla. Empirian 
toisessa osassa puolestaan käytetään lineaarisella 
regressiomenetelmällä estimoituja luottoluokitusmalleja. 
Luottoluokitusmalliin lisätään tällöin yksi tilinpäätösoikaisujen 
määrää kuvaava muuttuja kerrallaan, tarkoituksena tutkia 
oikaisujen ja luottoluokitusten välistä suhdetta. Lisäksi 
luottoluokitusmalli estimoidaan raportoidulla ja oikaistulla 
aineistolla, ja aineistojen selitysasteiden eron merkitsevyyttä 
testataan. 
 
Tulokset   Empirian ensimmäinen osa osoittaa, että pääomaintensiteetti, 
operatiivinen riski, velkaisuusaste ja julkisen kaupankäynnin 
kohteena oleminen ovat tärkeitä tekijöitä tilinpäätösoikaisujen 
määrän selittämisessä. Oikaisujen taustalla oleva syy liittyy täten 
yrityskohtaisiin päätöksiin rahoituksesta, pääomarakenteesta ja 
sopimusteknisistä ratkaisuista. Empirian toisen osan tulokset 
osoittavat, että ennen oikaisujen tekemistä IFRS-yritysten 
luottoluokitukset ovat US GAAP -yrityksiä korkeammalla. 
Oikaisut kuitenkin nostavat US GAAP -yritysten luottoluokituksia. 
Paikallisten standardien mukaan raportoivien yritysten 
luottoluokitukset puolestaan laskevat oikaisujen seurauksena 
suhteessa US GAAP -yrityksiin. Tutkielman tulokset osoittavat, 
että tilinpäätösoikaisuilla on merkitystä luottoanalyysissä. 
 
Avainsanat   Tilinpäätösoikaisut, tilinpäätösinformaation laatu, luottoluokitus, 
tilinpäätösstandardit 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1  Background of the Subject 
 
The introduction of the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) for listed 
companies globally around the world can be seen as one of the most significant regulatory 
changes in the history of accounting. Since 2001, over 100 countries have either required or 
permitted the use of IFRS (IASB, 2009a). The business community, accounting professional 
bodies, accounting standard-setting institutions and capital market regulators in many 
countries have made tremendous efforts to enhance the quality of financial statement 
information during the last decades as a result of the rapid growth in international business 
and of the globalization of capital markets. The goal of the International Accounting 
Standards Board (IASB) is to develop high quality, understandable and enforceable 
accounting standards that are globally acceptable. Nowadays IFRS play an active role in the 
globalization of capital markets and globally promote the comparability and transparency of 
financial reporting. (Chen et al., 2009.) 
 
The objective of financial statements is often defined as providing useful information for 
decision making. Decreasing information asymmetries and thus increasing the usefulness of 
information can help investors and other users of information to make better decisions. 
Increasing the quality of financial statement information has indeed desirable economic 
consequences, such as higher liquidity and lower cost of capital (Diamond & Verrecchia, 
1991) as well as increased foreign ownership (Covrig et al., 2007). In the context of credit 
ratings, on the other hand, lower quality of financial statement information increases default 
risk (Duffie & Lando, 2001) and is associated with lower ratings (Jorion et al., 2007). 
 
During the last decades, the importance of credit ratings has been constantly growing. The 
market capitalization of Moody‟s, one of the largest credit rating agencies, is currently around 
US$ 5 billion (2009a). The ratings and analysis of Moody‟s track debt covering more than 
100 sovereign nations (2009b). Standard & Poor‟s, on the other hand, rates approximately 
US$ 32 trillion of debt, issued in more than 100 countries (2009). 
 
Credit ratings are highly important for several economic actors and market participants, 
including bond issuers, buy- and sell-side investors, contracting parties and regulatory 
authorities. Debt issuers use credit ratings to improve the marketability and the pricing of 
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their debt. Buy-side investors may use them to assess credit risk and to comply with 
investment guidelines or regulations, whereas sell-side investors may use ratings to determine 
the amount of collateral to hold against derivatives credit exposure. In addition, ratings can be 
used in private contracts in collateral clauses, and they are widely used by regulators, for 
instance in Basel 2. (Jorion et al., 2007.) 
 
Financial statement information constitutes a significant source of information in the credit 
rating process. Furthermore, evaluating the quality of financial statement information is a 
critical part of the process. Both Standard & Poor‟s and Moody‟s make analytical adjustments 
in order to capture more faithfully underlying economics and to level the differences among 
companies. From the view point of a credit rating agency, the quality of financial statement 
information can be seen in the amount of financial statement adjustments that the rating 
agency makes during a rating process. Financial statement adjustments are expected to matter 
in credit analysis, and thus have an impact on credit rating, since considerable time and effort 
is spent on making them. On the one hand, adjustments can be seen as a measure of financial 
statement information quality, having a negative association with ratings. The rationale is that 
the more there is need for adjustments, the lower is the quality of the reported financial 
statement information. On the other hand, adjustments can be seen as a means to improve the 
comparability of information between different companies, resulting in an increased 
usefulness of information. According to this view, the amount of financial statement 
adjustments made during a rating process is positively associated with credit ratings. 
 
1.2 Research Question  
 
This thesis investigates whether financial statement adjustments made during the rating 
process matter in credit analysis. Answering the research question requires analyzing two 
related questions, illustrated in Figure 1. Firstly, the thesis concentrates on examining the 
determinants underlying the amount of adjustments (1
st
 question). Thus, the first part of 
empirical analyses offers descriptive evidence of reporting standards and company-specific 
factors and of their association with the amount of adjustments. Secondly, the thesis addresses 
the question of whether the amount of financial statement adjustments is associated with 
actual credit ratings (2
nd
 question). 
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Figure 1: Structure of the Research
1st Question 2nd Question
Financial Statement 
Adjustments
Reporting Standards
Company-specific 
Factors
Rating
Quality of Financial 
Statement Information
 
 
The contribution of this thesis is firstly to provide evidence of the difference between reported 
and adjusted data. Secondly, the thesis shows which determinants affect the amount of 
financial statement adjustments. Thirdly, the thesis illustrates whether the amount of financial 
statement adjustments is associated with credit ratings. 
 
1.3 Research Design 
 
The empirical analysis of the thesis consists of two separate questions. In the first part, the 
focus is on how the amount of adjustments can be explained. This question is addressed by 
constructing 5 different variables describing the amount of adjustments. The variables are 
used one at a time as dependent variables in a linear regression. With US GAAP being 
considered as benchmark standards, the variables explaining adjustments include reporting 
standards IFRS and local GAAPs as well as variables describing various company-specific 
and country-related factors. The second part, on the other hand, examines the second question 
presented in the previous section by including the variables describing the amount of 
adjustments one at a time in a credit rating model. The focus is then on the adjustment 
variables and interaction terms between GAAPs and adjustments as well as on GAAP 
dummies. The research method used also in the second part is linear regression. 
 
The data used in the analyses is provided by one of the largest credit rating agencies. The 
agency will be referred to as Credit Rating Agency X. The empirical analyses use two sets of 
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data. The main data consists of the time period 2004-2007, including 196 companies reporting 
under US GAAP, IFRS and local GAAPs. Moreover, the IFRS firms included in the main 
data are analyzed more thoroughly in terms of the adjustment type, using the second set of 
data from year 2007. The data includes companies active in the telecommunications industry. 
Other industries are not investigated due to data availability. 
 
The telecommunications industry has been highly stable for over a century and is 
characterized by its history of government-sanctioned and government-owned monopolies. 
Recently, however, as a result of deregulation, privatization, the development of wireless 
technologies and the global adoption of Internet, intense competition and fragmentation have 
rapidly reshaped the industry. Technological developments have created competition and 
increased the introduction of new products and services. The industry involves diversified 
communication providers who can offer the same service by different means. (Moody‟s, 
2007.)  
 
Today, as a result of advances in network technology, the telecommunications industry is less 
about traditional telephone calls, although they still are the industry‟s biggest revenue 
generator, and increasingly more about text and images. Of the different customer segments, 
residential markets are the most challenging in terms of revenues and profitability. The 
success depends largely on brand name strength and efficient billing systems. Big corporate 
customers, on the other hand, being less price-sensitive than residential customers, spend 
large amounts of money on telecommunication infrastructure and also pay for premium 
services to support their operations. In addition, telecommunication operators also provide 
services on wholesale markets to other companies active in the same industry. (Investopedia, 
2009.) Telecommunication companies are characterized by high capital intensity as the 
network infrastructure requires significant investments for the maintenance and introduction 
of new services, indicating high fixed costs. Additionally, the asset life cycle is rather short as 
technological trends change fast. (Moody‟s, 2007.) 
 
1.4 Main Findings 
 
First, the evidence suggests that capital intensity, operative risk and leverage are important in 
explaining financial statement adjustments. All of the mentioned characteristics have a 
positive association with the amount of adjustments. Additionally, the results indicate that 
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public companies face fewer adjustments relative to private companies and that the main 
companies of a corporate group also face fewer adjustments relative to the other companies. 
The ultimate underlying reason for adjustments seems to be company-specific decisions 
concerning financing and capital structure as well as contractual matters. 
 
Second, the evidence demonstrates that, without any financial statement adjustments, credit 
ratings are higher for companies reporting under IFRS relative to companies reporting under 
US GAAP. However, adjustments increase ratings for US firms and thus bring IFRS and US 
companies closer to each other. Financial statements become more comparable between 
companies, which in turn decreases the information risk and increases the usefulness of 
information. As far as local GAAP companies are concerned, adjustments have a negative 
association with ratings. As local GAAPs are reporting standards of lower quality relative to 
US GAAP, adjustments do not decrease the information risk enough. Thus, the effect of 
adjustments is smaller for local GAAP companies. This thesis finds that financial statement 
adjustments do matter in credit analysis. 
 
1.5  Structure of the Research 
 
This thesis is organized in the following way. Chapter 2 handles the quality of financial 
statement information. Firstly, the concept of quality is introduced and the factors affecting 
quality are pointed out. The latter part of the chapter concentrates more specifically on the 
quality of IFRS with respect to local GAAPs and US GAAP. Chapter 3 deals with credit 
ratings. It first introduces the key determinants taken into account during the rating process as 
well as the main financial statement adjustments made by credit rating agencies. The chapter 
then goes on to discuss how the quality of financial statement information affects credit 
ratings. Finally, Chapter 3 illustrates how credit ratings can be modelled. Chapter 4 presents 
the research hypothesis. Chapter 5 describes the sample data used in the thesis and illustrates 
the descriptive statistics and variables used during the analyses. Chapter 6 describes the 
empirical tests performed and reports the results. Chapter 7 concludes the research. 
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2 QUALITY OF FINANCIAL STATEMENT INFORMATION IN AN 
INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT 
 
The first part of Chapter 2 handles the quality of financial statement information in general, 
whereas the latter part concentrates more specifically on the quality of IFRS relative to other 
reporting standards. The first part of the chapter begins with defining the concept of quality. 
Quality is defined through its desirable characteristics. The section then goes on to illustrate 
the factors that affect quality as well as the economic consequences resulting from higher 
quality. The latter part, on the other hand, considers the quality of IFRS first with respect to 
local GAAPs and then relative to US GAAP. The very last section of the chapter discusses the 
international convergence process between the IASB and the FASB. 
 
2.1 Defining the Concept of Quality 
 
The IASB Framework (2001) defines the goal of financial statements as to provide 
information about the financial position, performance and changes in the financial position of 
an entity that is useful to a wide range of users in making economic decisions. The Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB), on the other hand, includes the objectives of financial 
reporting in its Statement of Concepts. According to the Statement of Financial Accounting 
Concepts (SFAC) No. 1, financial reporting should provide information that is useful to 
present and potential investors and creditors and other users in making rational investment, 
credit, and similar decisions (FASB, 2008a). Hence, usefulness is the primary objective for 
financial statement information according to both the IASB and the FASB. 
 
According to the IASB Framework (2001), the four principal qualitative characteristics that 
make information useful to its users include understandability, relevance, reliability and 
comparability. The Framework acknowledges that in practice a trade-off between the 
characteristics is often needed. Troberg also adds (2007, 32) materiality to the essential 
characteristics. 
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SFAC 2 (FASB, 2008b) defines the desirable characteristics of information under US GAAP. 
Relevance and reliability are the two primary qualities in order to make accounting 
information useful. Moreover, comparability and consistency promote usefulness. According 
to SFAC 2: 
 
“Relevant accounting information is capable of making a difference in a decision by 
helping users to form predictions about the outcomes of past, present, and future events or 
to conform or correct prior expectations. Information can make a difference to decisions 
by improving decision makers‟ capacities to predict or by providing feedback on earlier 
expectations. 
 
To be reliable, information must have representational faithfulness and it must be 
verifiable and neutral. 
 
Information about a particular enterprise gains greatly in usefulness if it can be compared 
with similar information about other enterprises and with similar information about the 
same enterprise for some other period or some other point in time.” 
 
According to Scott (2009, 65), transparent, precise or high quality financial statements are 
informative since they convey lots of information to investors. Moreover, the extent of 
informativeness of financial statements depends on their relevance and reliability. Relevant 
information informs about the firm‟s future prospects whereas reliable information faithfully 
represents without bias what it is intended to represent, following the definitions of SFAC 2. 
(Scott 2009, 24.) 
 
Ball (2006), on the other hand, defines financial reporting quality rather broadly as satisfying 
the demand for financial reporting. High quality financial statements provide useful 
information to a variety of users. This objective requires 1) accurate depiction of economic 
reality, 2) low capacity for managerial manipulation, 3) timeliness, in the sense that all 
economic value added gets recorded eventually and 4) asymmetric timeliness, referring to 
timelier incorporation of bad news relative to good news in the financial statements. Ball goes 
on further to list different functions of IFRS. He states that IFRS are intended to: 
 
1. reflect economic substance more than legal form; 
 
2. reflect economic gains and losses in a more timely manner; 
 
3. make earnings more informative; 
 
4. provide more useful balance sheets; and to 
 
5. curtail the historical Continental European discretion afforded managers to 
manipulate provisions, created hidden reserves, smooth earnings and hide 
economic losses from public view. 
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From a value relevance point of view, Barth, Landsman and Lang (2008) defines higher 
quality earnings as better reflecting a firm‟s underlying economics. First, higher quality 
accounting results from applying accounting standards that require the recognition of amounts 
that are intended to faithfully represent a firm‟s underlying economics. Second, higher quality 
accounting is less subject to opportunistic managerial discretion. Third, higher quality 
accounting has less non-opportunistic error in estimating accruals. 
 
As the concept of quality is very abstract, prior academic literature has used different metrics 
considered as proxies for the quality of financial statement information. Concepts used (for 
instance Barth et al. 2008; Barth et al. 2006) include timely loss recognition, value relevance 
and earnings management. Higher frequency of large negative net income is evidence of more 
timely loss recognition. Higher explanatory powers of income and equity book value for 
prices, and stock return for earnings are evidence of more value relevance. Regarding 
earnings management, higher accounting quality is reflected by higher variance of the change 
in net income, higher ratio of the variances of the change in net income and change in cash 
flows, less negative correlation between accruals and cash flows, and lower frequency of 
small positive net income. Jorion, Shi and Zhang (2007), on the other hand, measures quality 
and the value relevance of accounting ratios in a credit risk analysis with the McFadden 
pseudo-R-squared from the ordered probit regression of credit ratings. 
 
2.2 Determinants of Quality 
 
The previous section aimed at defining the concept of quality. This part concentrates on 
factors that affect the quality of financial statement information. The section will demonstrate 
that quality is a complex outcome of many determinants. The focus of the referred literature is 
on the determinants of quality relating to IFRS adoption. 
 
According to Barth et al. (2008), the three factors of IFRS quality are the existence of the 
IASB, management‟s discretion to report accounting amounts that reflect economic reality, 
and the firm‟s regulatory, enforcement and attestation environment. Soderstrom and Sun 
(2007), on the other hand, enumerates several determinants of financial statement information 
quality after IFRS adoption and divides them as: 
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1. The quality of accounting standards chosen; 
 
2. Legal and political systems; 
 
3. Development of financial markets; 
 
4. Capital structure; 
 
5. Ownership structure; and 
 
6. Tax system. 
 
All of these determinants have a direct effect on the quality of financial statement 
information. In addition, legal and political systems have an indirect impact on quality 
through the incentives for financial reporting. Reporting incentives arise from both the supply 
and demand for information. Financial reporting can be seen as an equilibrium outcome 
determined by the costs of disclosure, including the cost of preparation as well as the costs of 
leaking proprietary information, and the benefits of meeting contracting parties‟ demand for 
information. (Soderstrom & Sun, 2007.) Figure 2 illustrates the relations between the quality 
of financial statement information and its determinants. 
 
Figure 2: Determinants of Quality
2
Incentives from
3 7 9 11
5
6 8
1 4 10
(adapted, Soderstrom & Sun, 2007)
Legal and Political 
System
Accounting 
Standards
Financial Market 
Development
Tax 
System
OwnershipCapital 
Structure
Quality of Financial 
Statement Information
 
 
Arrow 1. Quality is determined firstly by the quality of the financial reporting standards 
chosen. Soderstrom and Sun (2007) states that financial reporting under IFRS would be 
expected to increase in value relevance and reliability if the IASB continues to improve the 
quality of IFRS. The goal of the IASB is to develop an internationally acceptable set of high 
quality financial reporting standards. To achieve this objective, the IASB has issued principle-
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based standards, as well as taken steps to remove allowable accounting alternatives and to 
require accounting measurements that better reflect a firm‟s economic position and 
performance. (Barth et al., 2008.) 
 
Accounting amounts that better reflect a firm‟s underlying economics can increase the quality 
of financial statement information because doing so provides investors with information 
helping them to make investment decisions. Quality could also increase because of changes in 
the financial reporting system simultaneous with firms‟ adoption of IFRS, for instance 
through more rigorous enforcement. (Barth et al., 2008.) Furthermore, investors will find it 
less costly to identify earnings management when using a universal accounting method. They 
can compare different accounting assumptions between firms and countries to evaluate the 
quality of financial reporting. This will put pressure on management for truthful reporting. 
(Soderstrom & Sun, 2007.) 
 
However, opponents argue that, because of differences between countries, a single set of 
standards may not be suitable for all settings and may not uniformly improve value relevance 
and reliability. By limiting managerial discretion relating to accounting alternatives, IFRS 
could eliminate the firm‟s ability to report accounting measurements that are more reflective 
of its economic position and performance. In addition, the features of the financial reporting 
system other than the standards themselves could affect the quality by eliminating any 
improvement arising from the adoption of IFRS. For example, lax enforcement can result in a 
limited compliance with the standards, therefore restricting their effectiveness. Thus, it is not 
clear whether the application of IFRS would result in higher quality of financial statement 
information. (Barth et al., 2008.) A single set of accounting standards may not improve 
accounting uniformly for each firm and country because there are other factors that affect 
quality as well. The remainder of this section discusses those other determinants of quality in 
more detail. 
 
Arrow 2. Legal and political systems have a major impact on the quality of financial statement 
information in several ways, both directly and indirectly. Accounting standard setting is 
undoubtedly a political process in which different users of information try to exert significant 
influence on standard setters. The International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) was 
replaced by the IASB in 2001 in order to reduce the political influence on standard setting. In 
the US, on the other hand, the FASB replaced the Accounting Principles Board (APB) of the 
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American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) in 1972 because of its lack of 
independence. Nevertheless, global politics continue to put enormous pressure on the IASB. 
This was seen, for instance, with the fair value accounting standard, IAS 39. (Soderstrom & 
Sun, 2007.) 
 
Regarding the indirect effect of legal systems through accounting standard setting, in the 
common law countries the right to set standards stems from the information demands of 
investors, and accounting standards are mostly set by private organisations, such as the FASB. 
On the other hand, code law was developed to allow governments to control the setting and 
interpretation of laws. Accounting standards of code law countries are thus primarily 
influenced by governmental priorities. (Soderstrom & Sun, 2007.) 
 
Arrow 3. La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) suggests that common law 
countries have better accounting systems and better protection of investors than code law 
countries, and therefore higher quality of financial statement information. Additionally, legal 
enforcement is higher in common law counties relative to code law countries. The 
enforcement role of legal systems will be highly important when considering the quality of 
financial statement information following the adoption of IFRS. The IASB issues IFRS but 
does not have enforcement power. Instead, enforcement power stays in the security exchanges 
and courts where firms are listed. (Shipper, 2005.) Furthermore, as IFRS are principles-based, 
auditors and accountants need to follow general principles rather than detailed standards and 
apply the principles to specific situations (Ball, 2006). In countries with strong shareholder 
protection Soderstrom and Sun (2007) expects interpretation to lean more towards a fair 
presentation of information to shareholders whereas in countries with strong creditor 
protection they expect interpretation to rather satisfy the contracting demands of banks. 
 
Arrow 4. The demand for accounting information depends on the nature of financial markets. 
Financial markets and the demand for information from market participants provide 
incentives for firm managers to improve the quality of their financial reports. Market 
participants demand information so as to reduce information asymmetry. Francis, Khurana 
and Pereina (2005) suggests that firms seeking for external financing disclose voluntarily 
more information than the minimum requirements and that an expanded disclosure policy 
leads to a lower cost of both equity and debt capital. Financial reporting is thus an important 
means to send signals to the market. Burstahler, Hail and Leuz (2007), on the other hand, 
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finds that public firms engage less in earnings management relative to private companies in 
countries with large and highly developed equity markets. This may be either because stock 
markets provide incentives for firms to make earnings more informative in order to reduce the 
cost of capital or because stock markets screen out firms with less informative earnings. 
 
Arrow 5. The characteristics of the legal and political systems influence the quality of 
financial statement information indirectly through the development of financial markets. 
Firms in countries with strong investor protection and lower levels of government 
expropriation will find it easier to get financing since investors are guaranteed to get a return 
on their investments, and also the number of investors who are willing to provide financing 
will increase. La Porta et al. (1998) finds that the size of capital markets is determined by the 
character of legal rules and the quality of law enforcement. Stulz and Williamson (2003), on 
the other hand, suggests that a country‟s major religion affects the size of its stock market. 
Thus, cultural considerations cannot be ignored when examining why investor protection 
differs across countries. The relation between culture and investor rights is particularly strong 
for creditor rights. Furthermore, Catholic countries have weaker creditor rights relative to 
other countries. 
 
Arrow 6. As far as capital structure is concerned, shareholders and creditors use different 
methods to reduce information asymmetry. Sun (2005) demonstrates that banks demand less 
financial reporting than shareholders because of their private access to firm managers whereas 
outside shareholders are more dependent on financial reporting to reduce information 
asymmetry. In addition, the usefulness of financial reporting in improving capital investment 
decisions decreases with the amount of debt financing. 
 
Arrow 7. Soderstrom and Sun (2007) states that countries with high dominance of bank 
financing and political risks experience lower quality of financial statement information. If 
creditors are highly protected, firms are more easily able to get bank financing at a lower cost. 
Furthermore, a high possibility of government expropriation and corruption is associated with 
a less frequent use of financial reporting as a method to reduce information asymmetry. 
Capital structures are thus affected by legal and political systems. 
 
Arrow 8. The ownership structure of a firm has a direct effect on the quality of financial 
statement information by several ways. Firstly, earnings of private firms are less informative 
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than those of public firms (Burgstahler et al., 2007). Since stakeholders in private firms have 
easy access to firms‟ financial reporting information, there is a lower demand for high quality 
financial reporting. Controlling shareholders active in management reduce thus the demand 
for financial reporting. Secondly, the separation of control and cash flow rights leads to an 
agency problem between controlling and minority shareholders. Controlling shareholders may 
have incentives to exploit the wealth of minority shareholders and to report accounting 
information for self-interested purposes, causing the reported earnings to lose credibility to 
outside investors. (Fan & Wong, 2002.) Thirdly, as controlling shareholders have long-term 
interests in firms and they invest with a long-term perspective, they may have incentives to 
smooth earnings. Finally, foreign investors suffer from the lack of institutional knowledge and 
may therefore demand more information than domestic investors. (Soderstrom & Sun, 2007.) 
 
Arrow 9. La Porta et al. (1998) finds a lower concentration of ownership in countries with 
stronger investor protection. One of the costs of heavily concentrated companies is that their 
core investors are not diversified. Secondly, these firms find it difficult to raise equity finance 
from minority investors. Hence, small and diversified shareholders are unlikely to be 
important in countries unable to protect their rights. Good accounting standards and 
shareholder protection are associated with a lower concentration of ownership. Political 
systems affect ownership structures in the sense that politicians may prefer closely-held firms 
since this would make secret lobbying and bribes less likely to leak out from firms. 
 
Arrow 10. Countries with a close linkage between accounting and tax laws are likely to 
witness lower quality accounting standards since earnings are less likely to reflect the 
underlying business.  Furthermore, a high tax rate creates an incentive to reduce taxable 
income. (Guenther & Young, 2000.) 
 
Arrow 11. Legal and political systems influence the quality of financial statement information 
also indirectly through tax systems. Guenther and Young (2000) demonstrates that common 
law countries have a lower book-tax conformity. Moreover, tax setting as well as the 
appointment of a tax collection authority is a political process. The effectiveness of the tax 
collection process is directly influenced by a country‟s level of corruption. 
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2.3 Economic Consequences of Quality 
 
Increasing the quality of financial statement information has the objective of reducing 
information asymmetry and thereby improving informativeness and decision-usefulness for 
all users, as discussed earlier. This section points out economic consequences of higher 
quality financial statement information. These are capital-market effects measured in the 
markets after an improvement in the information environment. Recent literature in this field 
(for instance Leuz & Verrecchia, 2000; Diamond & Verrecchia, 1991; Ashbaugh & Pincus, 
2001) has focused on the change from a local GAAP to IFRS. The underlying premise is thus 
that the change represents a change to a GAAP of higher quality financial reporting. 
However, as a result of the interdependence between accounting standards, the country‟s 
institutional setting and firms‟ incentives discussed in the previous section, the economic 
consequences of changing accounting systems may vary from country to country (Soderstrom 
& Sun, 2007). Furthermore, academic literature has often examined separately the effects of 
voluntary and mandatory adoption of IFRS. Since the late 1990s, an increasing amount of 
firms have adopted IFRS voluntarily. The history of mandatory adoption, on the other hand, is 
rather short and is related to the mandatory IFRS adoption within EU, starting from the year 
2005. (Chen, Tang, Jiang & Lin, 2009.) 
 
With respect to voluntary IFRS adoption, Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) investigates its effect 
on the cost of capital by using bid-ask spreads
1
 and trading volume as proxies for the cost of 
capital. The research suggests that non-transparent information environments decrease the 
demand for stocks, increase bid-ask spreads and lower share turnover ratios. To attract 
potential investors, firms with low financial reporting quality have to issue stocks at a 
discount and hence at a higher cost of capital. On the other hand, large firms will disclose 
more information since they benefit the most. The decreased cost of capital attracts increased 
demand from large investors as a result of the greater liquidity. (Diamond & Verrecchia, 
1991.) Firms voluntarily adopting IFRS or US GAAP have lower bid-ask spreads and higher 
stock turnover ratios, the difference between IFRS and US GAAP not being statistically 
significant. Furthermore, Ashbaugh and Pincus (2001) points out that IFRS adoption reduces 
analysts‟ cost of information acquisition and improves forecast accuracy. After IFRS 
adoption, forecast errors decrease and the number of news reports increases. Covrig, DeFond 
and Hung (2007), on the other hand, finds that foreign mutual fund ownership is significantly 
                                                 
1
 the difference between buying price and selling price of a share 
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higher for adopters of IFRS, indicating that voluntary adoption consequently attracts foreign 
capital. Voluntary adoption reduces home bias
2
 among foreign investors, thereby improving 
capital allocation efficiency. 
 
When examining the stock market‟s perception on mandatory IFRS adoption, the reaction is 
significantly positive to the events that increased the likelihood of the adoption of IFRS and 
negative to the events that decreased the likelihood of the adoption. Additionally, the reaction 
is stronger for firms that are not cross-listed in the US, i.e. for firms with lower pre-adoption 
information quality and higher pre-adoption information asymmetry. Thus, equity investors 
expect information quality benefits from IFRS adoption. However, the benefits are expected 
to be smaller for companies cross-listing in the US, as US GAAP are closer to IFRS than most 
European domestic GAAPs. Furthermore, the reaction is less positive for firms domiciled in 
code law countries, suggesting that investors are concerned about the enforcement of IFRS. 
(Armstrong, Barth, Jagolinzer & Riedl, 2008.) Pae, Thorton and Welker (2006) finds that 
Tobin‟s Q 3 increases more for EU firms that 1) are not listed in the US, 2) are family-
controlled and 3) have a low analyst following, indicating that the announcement of IFRS 
adoption in the EU leads to expectations of reduced future agency costs.  Minority 
shareholders of the firms with significant information asymmetries are among the major 
beneficiaries of the financial reporting reform. 
 
Daske, Hail, Leuz and Verdi (2008) examines capital-market effects in terms of market 
liquidity, cost of capital and equity valuation. The findings suggest that market liquidity 
increases around the time of IFRS introduction. The evidence also shows a decline in the cost 
of capital and an increase in equity valuation but these effects occur one year prior to the 
mandatory adoption date, suggesting that the market anticipates the economic consequences. 
Capital-market effects are stronger for those firms that voluntarily change to IFRS. 
Furthermore, when searching for factors driving the capital-market reactions, the research 
finds that capital-market effects appear only in countries where the institutional environment 
provides incentives to be transparent and in countries of a strong legal enforcement regime. 
Also, countries having greater differences between the local GAAP and IFRS as well as 
countries without a prior convergence strategy towards IFRS experience stronger effects 
                                                 
2
 investors reluctant to make cross-border investments 
3
 a measure for firm value, defined as the market value of common equity plus the book value of assets minus 
the book value of common equity minus deferred taxes divided by the book value of total assets 
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around the mandatory adoption, which is consistent with the findings of Armstrong et al. 
(2008) and Pae et al. (2006) discussed above. 
 
2.4 IFRS Quality Relative to Other Reporting Standards 
 
The last part of Chapter 2 concentrates on the quality of IFRS. Firstly, IFRS quality is 
discussed relative to domestic GAAPs. Secondly, differences in relation to US GAAP are 
presented. The very last section of the chapter introduces the international convergence 
process between the FASB and the IASB. 
 
2.4.1 IFRS Relative to Domestic GAAPs 
 
Barth et al. (2008) examines whether the application of IFRS is associated with higher quality 
of financial statement information. The research finds that firms applying IFRS provide 
financial statement information of higher quality than firms applying non-US domestic 
standards. Namely, IFRS firms have less earnings management, more timely loss recognition 
and more value relevance of accounting amounts in the post-adoption period than firms 
applying non-US domestic standards. 
 
Moreover, Barth et al. (2008) finds that firms applying IFRS have a higher quality of financial 
statement information in the post-adoption period than in the pre-adoption period, and the 
increase in quality is greater than for firms not applying IFRS. Applying IFRS is thus 
associated with greater improvement in quality. Furthermore, differences in accounting 
metrics in the pre-adoption period do not explain the differences in the post-adoption period. 
However, as the application of IFRS consists of the combined features of the financial 
reporting system, including standards, their interpretation, enforcement, and litigation, the 
research states that one cannot be sure that the findings are attributable to the change in the 
financial reporting system rather than to changes in firms‟ incentives and the economic 
environment. 
 
A report of Moody‟s (2008) considers whether the change from local GAAPs to IFRS in the 
European Union has resulted in financial statements that are easier to compare and more 
useful from a credit analysis perspective. The report states that the adoption of IFRS has 
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undoubtedly generated benefits. Despite this, financial statements are not necessarily easier to 
compare due to the less helpful features of IFRS. 
 
Namely, Moody‟s (2008) points out that profits restated under IFRS are generally higher 
relative to those reported under a local GAAP. The increase in net income results from the 
discontinuance of goodwill amortization. The improvement in EBITDA, on the other hand, is 
due to several reasons. Firstly, EBITDA is improved because pension deficits are accounted 
as a reduction in equity, thus avoiding the need to amortise deficits against EBITDA. Also, a 
part of the pension expense is separated into an interest component, removing it from 
EBITDA. Secondly, development costs must be capitalized under IFRS, provided that certain 
conditions are met, and reported as an intangible asset and as capital expenditures. Thirdly, 
when faced with a significant delay between the incurrence of a long-term liability and its 
settlement in cash, as in the case of lawsuits, the related expense is recorded as interest in the 
income statement. 
 
Moody‟s (2008) reports that IFRS result in better portraying the underlying reality in many 
occasions. This is because IFRS generally necessitate a more comprehensive reporting 
relative to local GAAPs, specifically when considering cash flows, pension obligations, leases 
and liabilities of uncertain timing and amount. To begin with, cash flow statements are 
mandatory under IFRS. They are used during the rating process in assessing whether a 
company generates sufficiently cash flow from its operations to service its debt. Moreover, 
several key ratios are derived from the cash flow statement information. Regarding pensions, 
debt-like obligation for pensions is easier to assess under IFRS and can be an important factor 
in evaluating the relative creditworthiness of companies. Finally, more informative reporting 
on leases allows new insights into the scale and extent of the off-balance-sheet obligations. 
 
However, Moody‟s (2008) reports that financial statements under IFRS are not necessarily 
easier to compare. This is because of a lack of standardisation in certain areas and also due to 
inconsistent interpretations by companies and their auditors. First, the lack of standardisation 
concerns the accounting for jointly controlled entities and cash flow statements. The report 
finds that French and Spanish companies favour proportionate consolidation whereas others 
prefer the one-line equity method. Regarding cash flow statements, the same cash flows, 
namely interest received and paid, dividends received and income taxes paid, can be 
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represented under different headings in the cash flow statement, leading to difficulties of 
comparability. 
 
Second, concerning the interpretation of standards, the report (Moody‟s, 2008) states that the 
control principle
4
 can be difficult to implement in practice. Furthermore, companies interpret 
differently the accounting for leases. Arrangements that are largely similar in substance are 
dealt with differently in the financial statements. Also, there are different views on 
categorising certain cash flows and on what constitutes an operating activity. 
 
Moreover, Moody‟s (2008) cautions that the usefulness of IFRS can be at risk because of 
false volatility and undue complexity. False volatility is introduced due to the use of different 
derivatives whereas undue complexity is related namely to different swap contracts. The true 
level of debt can be difficult to determine as the practise of reporting debt varies from country 
to country. For instance, in France and Spain, the tendency is to include financial derivatives 
in the headline figure for debt whereas in Germany, Scandinavia and the UK they are usually 
left out. Additionally, the actual cost of a company‟s debt, i.e. interest expense, can be 
difficult to determine on the basis of financial statements. 
 
Soderstrom and Sun (2007) expects that cross-country differences are likely to prevail 
following the IFRS adoption since the quality of financial statement information is a function 
of the firm‟s overall institutional setting. Hence, future improvements in quality will be 
largely dependent on changes in a country‟s legal and political system and financial reporting 
incentives. 
 
2.4.2 IFRS Relative to US GAAP 
 
Barth, Landsman, Lang and Williams (2006) examines whether IFRS are associated with a 
higher quality of financial statement information relative to US GAAP in terms of earnings 
management, timely loss recognition and higher value relevance of accounting amounts. Prior 
research (Leuz, Nanda & Wysocki, 2003) suggests that accounting amounts reported by non-
US companies under a domestic GAAP are of lower quality than financial statements 
prepared applying US GAAP. Economies with strong legal enforcement (United States and 
United Kingdom) show the lowest level of earnings management whereas economies with 
                                                 
4
 IAS 27: Consolidated financial statements include all the entities that are controlled by the parent company. 
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weak enforcement (for instance, Italy and India) show the highest level of earnings 
management. 
 
Barth et al. (2006) finds that IFRS firms have a lower quality of financial statement 
information compared to US firms. IFRS firms report a significantly lower variance of the 
change in net income, a lower ratio of the variances of the change in net income and change in 
cash flows, a significantly more negative correlation between accruals and cash flow and a 
higher frequency of small positive net income as well as a significantly lower frequency of 
large negative net income and significantly lower value relevance of earnings and equity book 
value for share prices. Applying IFRS does move firms closer to US GAAP and thus reduces 
the quality differences. But even during the more recent years, accounting amounts for US 
firms are of higher quality than those for IFRS firms, regardless of the fact that IFRS 
underwent several changes during the sample period of nearly a decade.  
 
However, Barth et al. (2006) states that IFRS accounting amounts are of similar quality than 
US GAAP reconciled amounts presented on Form 20-F. At this point the research compared 
firms applying IFRS with firms applying a domestic GAAP and reconciling to US GAAP. 
Thus, the results suggest that IFRS accounting amounts provide investors with information of 
comparable quality to that provided under Form 20-F. Prior research (Lang, Raedy & Wilson, 
2005) has suggested that the reconciled US GAAP amounts provided by non-US companies 
are of lower quality than those under US GAAP. 
 
Leuz (2003), on the other hand, compares the efficacy of US GAAP to that of IFRS by using 
bid-ask spreads as a proxy for information asymmetry and trading volume as a proxy for 
liquidity on the Germany‟s New Market where companies can choose to report under IFRS or 
US GAAP. The rationale is that the better the financial reporting, the better the flow of 
information and the lower the information asymmetry, leading to greater liquidity. The 
findings suggest that IFRS are equivalent to US GAAP in terms of liquidity. 
 
Van der Meulen, Gaeremynck and Willekens (2006) also investigates the properties of IFRS 
companies compared to US GAAP companies listed on the Germany‟s New Market. 
Financial statement quality is measured in terms of value relevance, timeliness, predictability 
and accruals quality. The findings suggest that US GAAP earnings are very comparable to 
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IFRS earnings. Only in regard to the predictive ability of accounting information are US 
GAAP of higher quality. 
 
Tarca (2004) finds, examining the voluntary use of international standards (US GAAP or 
IFRS) in the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Japan and Australia in 1999-2000, that US 
GAAP are more extensively used than IFRS. The research attributes this to the impact of US 
GAAP in the international business environment and to the importance of US capital markets. 
However, firms not subject to the mandatory reconciliation requirements, such as companies 
traded in the US OTC
5
 market, more likely apply IFRS over US GAAP, supporting the view 
that IFRS are a low cost way of standardizing information. 
 
Van der Meulen et al. (2006) goes on to consider the reasons underlying the differences 
between IFRS and US GAAP. Firstly, differences between IFRS and US GAAP exist because 
of structural and organizational distinctions between the two sets of standards. According to 
the proponents of US GAAP, IFRS have not been subject to the same due process. On the 
contrary, the IFRS standard setting process may be more open to input from a wider interest 
group for this reason. Secondly, it is argued that the application of US rules-based standards 
results in more neutral information because of fewer opportunities to manage earnings. The 
IASB‟s approach relies more on principles whereas the FASB‟s approach relies more on 
rules. Reliance on principles specifies guidelines but requires judgement in application. On 
the contrary, reliance on rules specifies more requirements that leave less room for discretion. 
The flexibility of IFRS principles-based standards can allow firms to manage earnings, 
thereby decreasing the quality of financial statement information. (Barth et al, 2008.) On the 
other hand, the proponents of IFRS state that management can more freely signal the true 
economic situation and performance of the company. Thirdly, differences in the quality of 
financial statement information may also result from differences in specific standards. For 
instance, under IFRS it is possible to capitalize Research & Development costs resulting in 
more value relevant earnings. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5
 over-the-counter 
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2.4.3 International Convergence Process 
 
The last section of Chapter 2 handles the on-going international convergence process between 
the IASB and the FASB. Firstly, the convergence process is introduced and the recent 
development discussed. The section then goes on to illustrate the remaining differences 
between IFRS and US GAAP. Finally, the chapter ends with suggesting future challenges 
regarding the two sets of standards. 
 
Recent Development 
 
The convergence approach between the IASB and the FASB was documented in a 
Memorandum of Understanding in 2002 (IASB & FASB, 2002). The two Boards agreed to 
develop together a common set of high quality, fully compatible financial reporting standards 
to be used both in domestic and cross-border reporting. The ultimate objective of the 
convergence process is to make the two sets of standards as nearly as similar as possible 
across jurisdiction, to jointly cooperate on new standards and to improve the overall quality of 
the standards. 
 
The US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has taken an enormous step towards 
convergence by publishing a Roadmap in April 21, 2005 aiming at the elimination of the 
requirement that foreign private issuers present financial statements in accordance with US 
GAAP or with reconciliation to US GAAP. This requirement has been a major disincentive 
for companies to enter the US capital markets or become listed in the US. (Weiss, 2005.) The 
SEC‟s intention underlying the elimination of the requirement was to allow more investment 
opportunities both for US companies and international companies with US subsidiaries. 
Furthermore, having one set of reliable financial statements would increase investor 
confidence and companies would be able to look for foreign investors as well as the entrance 
to new markets. The risk and costs associated with the entrance to foreign markets would be 
reduced and a greater comparability achieved among international companies. (Ragan, Hadley 
and Raymond, 2007.) There were two major developments the SEC originally considered 
indispensable with regard to the elimination: firstly, the effectiveness of EU requirements for 
the mandatory use of IFRS by listed companies and, secondly, progress by the FASB and the 
IASB in reducing the differences between IFRS and US GAAP. (Weiss, 2005.) 
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The SEC agreed in December 21, 2007 to permit foreign private issuers to file financial 
statements prepared in accordance with IFRS without reconciliation to US GAAP (SEC, 
2007). Furthermore, it has proposed a Roadmap for the potential use of financial statements 
prepared in accordance with IFRS by US issuers (SEC, 2008). An issuer whose industry uses 
IFRS as the basis of financial reporting would be eligible to use IFRS, beginning with filings 
in 2010. The Roadmap contains several milestones that, if achieved, could lead to the required 
use of IFRS by US issuers in 2014. 
 
Remaining Differences 
 
As a result of the recent development, several countries have adopted IFRS on the basis that 
companies are able to access capital markets more efficiently throughout the world. However, 
important differences still prevail between IFRS and US GAAP. Ragan et al. (2007) lists the 
remaining major differences as follows: 
 
Extraordinary items
6
: Under IFRS the use of extraordinary items is prohibited whereas under 
US GAAP they are permitted. US GAAP require that the items are segregated from the results 
of ordinary operations and shown separately in the income statement. 
 
Format and methodology of cash flow statement
7
: In the cash flow statement the items interest 
paid, interest received, dividends paid, dividends received and taxes paid can be classified 
into different activity sections under IFRS based on professional judgement. Under US GAAP 
there is only one allowable classification for each item. Interest paid, interest and dividends 
received as well as taxes paid are operating cash flows. Dividends paid are financing cash 
flows. 
 
Presentation of jointly controlled entities
8
: IFRS allow the use of both the equity method and 
the proportionate consolidation method whereas US GAAP allow only the use of the equity 
method. 
 
                                                 
6
 Current standards are IAS 1 and Accounting Research Bulletin (ARB) 30. 
7
 Current standards are IAS 7 and SFAS 95. 
8
 Current standards are IAS 31 and SFAS 94. IASB has published an exposure draft in 2007 and plans to publish 
the new standard IFRS X Joint Arrangements in the first quarter of 2010. 
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Research and development costs
9
: Under IFRS research costs must be expensed and costs 
associated with the development can be capitalized if they meet a certain criteria. Under US 
GAAP all expenditures, except for costs associated with the development of computer 
software that will be sold later, have to be expensed in the period they are incurred.  
 
Share-based compensation
10
: Both sets of standards require the use of a fair value method. 
However, the existing differences include the definition of the grant date, the classification of 
awards between equity-based and cash-based shares and the attributed expenses for graded 
vesting scenarios, which may all have a substantial effect on the comparability of financial 
statements. 
 
Methods of accounting for inventory
11
: Under IFRS a reversing transaction is carried out as a 
result of an increase in value of an inventory that was previously written down. Under US 
GAAP a reversal is prohibited. In addition, US GAAP allow the use of LIFO whereas IFRS 
oppose the use of this method. 
 
Revenue recognition methods
12
: IFRS standards require the use of the percentage-of-
completion method to account for the sale of services. According to US GAAP, revenue is 
recognized when services have been rendered, it is reasonable to assume that the funds will be 
collectable, or there is persuasive evidence that an arrangement exists, and there is a 
determinable sales price. Specifically, revenue from software is recognized when it is 
delivered. Under IFRS there are no specific rules for software. Regarding construction 
contracts, the percentage-of-completion method is preferred by US GAAP and required by 
IFRS. However, US GAAP allow also the use of the completed contract method where 
revenue is recognized upon the completion of a project. 
 
Employee pension plans
13
: Both US GAAP and IFRS divide employee pension plans into 
defined contribution and defined benefit plans. However, there are differences regarding the 
definition of a defined contribution plan, amortization and recognition of actuarial gains and 
                                                 
9
 Current standards are IAS 38 and SFAS 2. 
10
 Current standards are IFRS 2 and SFAS 123. 
11
 Current standards are IAS 2, SFAS 151 and ARB 43. 
12
 Joint Board discussions are on-going. Estimated completion for the joint project is in 2011. Currently the 
guidance for IFRS is laid out in IAS 18 (Revenue) and IAS 11 (Construction Contracts) but the guidance for US 
GAAP can be found in numerous different standards, some of which are industry-specific. 
13
 Current standards are IAS 19 and SFAS 87. IASB has released an exposure draft in 2009 and envisages 
completion of the new standard in 2011. 
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losses, basis of the expected return on plan assets, recognition of a minimum pension liability 
as well as the recognition of losses due to elimination or reduction of benefits. 
 
Future Challenges 
 
American Accounting Association‟s Financial Accounting Standards Committee (AAA 
FASC, 2008) states that, since faced with no clear differences in quality between IFRS and 
US GAAP, competition, rather than harmonization, should be encouraged between the two 
sets of standards. The view supports permitting foreign private issuers a choice between IFRS 
and US GAAP. Additionally, the committee strongly recommends extending the choice of 
IFRS to US companies since it believes that standards-setting competition would help to 
improve both sets of standards. 
 
The key question of whether IFRS are of sufficient quality, i.e. as informative and useful, 
compared to US accounting standards is addressed by numerous research papers. Evidence 
shows that IFRS benefit both preparers and users of financial statements (see for instance 
Ashbaugh & Pincuss, 2001; Leuz, 2003; Barth et al., 2008; Covrig et al., 2007). Furthermore, 
the value relevance literature finds US GAAP to be very similar to the national GAAP of 
developed countries, such as the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, France and Germany. 
Since IFRS are highly influenced by the expertise and traditions of these countries, IFRS are 
likely to be of similar quality with US GAAP. (AAA FASC, 2008.) 
 
The report (AAA FASC, 2008) states that the research results suggesting that IFRS 
accounting standards are of high quality are independent of any global convergence process. 
However, sceptical views have been presented in the academic literature regarding the 
benefits of accounting standards harmonization. This derives from the concern that in reality 
the incentives of preparers and auditors of financial statements determine the quality of 
financial statements. Incentives are highly affected by legal, auditing, governance and 
regulatory regimes as well as by market forces. (Ball, Robin & Wu, 2003.) Forcing one global 
accounting solution may lead to applying form over substance. On the other hand, since 
accounting standards depend on a country‟s legal, auditing, regulatory, governance, and 
financing systems, accounting is an evolving process. Regulatory competition would benefit 
the development of good accounting standards. Competitive environment among standard-
 30 
setters, enterprises and investors would result in better accounting practices and standards as 
well as to a lower cost of capital. (Sunder, 2002.) 
 
Ball (2006) puts forward further concerns regarding the future. He points out that, despite 
increased globalization, most markets and political influences on financial reporting practice 
remain local for the foreseeable future. This makes it unclear how much convergence in the 
actual reporting practice will there turn out to be. Due to political and economic reasons, he 
expects the IFRS enforcement to be uneven around the world. Ball refers to the problem as 
the “IFRS brand name problem”. IFRS adoption is being viewed as a signal of quality. A free-
rider problem arises as it is essentially costless for lower-quality regimes to use the IFRS 
brand name. The IFRS adoption decision becomes uninformative about quality when the 
lower quality and the higher quality countries adopt IFRS. In order to make IFRS an 
informative signal of quality, a worldwide enforcement mechanism would be needed under 
which countries not effectively implementing IFRS would be penalized or prohibited from 
using the IFRS brand name. However, in the absence of such a mechanism, local political and 
economic factors will continue to influence local financial reporting practice. 
 
The widespread IFRS adoption raises a concern that investors will be mislead into believing 
that there is more uniformity in practice than there actually is. International differences in 
reporting quality can easily be hidden under the seemingly uniform standards even for the 
sophisticated investors. Moreover, the advantages of IFRS for investors in reduced 
information costs and information risk are at risk to be limited due to the uneven 
implementation. On the contrary, uneven implementation might even increase the information 
processing costs to international investors by hiding accounting inconsistencies at a less 
transparent level than differences in standards. Implementation has not received enough 
attention, and the focus has been more on what the rules say. However, implementation is, 
according to Ball (2006), the Achilles heel of IFRS. Furthermore, Ball (2006) cautions that 
the IASB is at risk of becoming a representative, politicized, polarized, UN-style body. He 
expects that in the future the IFRS-adopting nations will present their politically-legitimate 
argument of deserving a representation in the standard-setting process. 
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3 CREDIT RATINGS – FROM THE COMPLEX PROCESS TO A 
SIMPLE MODEL 
 
Chapter 3 concentrates on credit ratings. The chapter first introduces the concept of credit 
rating as a measure for credit risk. The second section of the chapter introduces the complex 
credit rating process as well as the several determinants affecting credit ratings. As the chapter 
moves to the third section, analytical financial statement adjustments are taken under 
examination and the most common standard adjustment types are presented. Finally, the last 
section turns to credit rating models and shows how prior literature has attempted to model 
the complex credit rating process as a function of financial ratios. 
 
3.1 Measure of Credit Risk 
 
In terms of public debt, investors are at distance relative to the issuer. Investors have to, to a 
large extent, rely on professional debt analysts, such as debt raters. Analysts and debt raters 
serve therefore an important role by closing the information gap between issuers and 
investors. (Palepu, Healy, Bernard & Peek 2007, 412.) 
 
The purpose of credit ratings is to measure the extent of credit risk. Credit risk, on the other 
hand, is defined as the probability of an unfavourable state of events occurring with respect to 
the interests of creditors (Wild, Subramanyam & Halsey 2007, 538). Kaplan and Urwitz 
(1979) views bond ratings as representing the judgement of informed and sophisticated 
financial analysts regarding a firm‟s creditworthiness. This judgment is expressed as a series 
of symbols, all reflecting the extent of riskiness. 
 
According to Standard & Poor‟s (2008), credit rating represents an opinion of the general 
creditworthiness of an obligor (issuer credit rating), or the credit risk associated with a 
particular debt security or other financial obligation (issue rating). Credit rating agencies issue 
both long-term and short-term credit ratings. Standard & Poor‟s divides its credit ratings into 
main categories ranging from AAA to D whereas Moody‟s uses symbols from Aaa to D. The 
ratings may be modified by adding a plus or minus sign (Standard & Poor‟s) or an index from 
1 to 3 (Moody‟s) to indicate the relative standing within the main rating categories. A short-
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term credit rating, on the other hand, is an assessment of an issuer‟s credit quality with respect 
to an instrument considered short-term in the relevant market (Standard & Poor‟s, 2008). 
 
An important distinction is made between investment-grade and speculative-grade debt. 
Investment-grade companies are those that have a rating of BBB or above. For instance, many 
funds are prohibited from investing in bonds below that grade. Of all the European public 
non-financial companies rated by Standard & Poor‟s, only around 1 % have a rating of AAA. 
In the 2005 fiscal year those firms had average interest expenses of 2.81 % relative to total 
debt. The cost of debt rises substantially when the rating falls to the speculative-grade. The 
average interest expenses relative to total debt in 2005 for BBB, BB and B rated firms were 
4.47 %, 5.86 % and 7.54 %, respectively. (Palepu et al. 2007, 412-413.) 
 
Bond ratings are used widely in the investment community as a measure of the riskiness of 
bonds. Alternatively, credit risk can be described with capital-market measures, namely with 
the yields or spreads of a firm‟s bonds.14 Regarding bond yields, they correlate strongly with 
bond ratings, with high-rated bonds selling at considerably lower yields than low-rated bonds 
(Kaplan & Urwitz, 1979). That is why low-rated, or speculative-grade, debt is often referred 
as high-yield debt. Credit returns are characterized of being highly skewed and fat-tailed. This 
means that there is a limited upside to be expected from any improvement in credit quality 
while there is a substantial downside resulting from a downgrade and a default. (Crouhy, 
Galai & Mark, 2000.) 
 
When considering bond spreads, Crouchy et al. (2000) states that risk of a downgrade is 
purely a credit spread risk. When the credit quality gets worse, the spread relative to the 
Treasury curve widens. However, when analyzing credit risk, one needs to account for the full 
integration of market risk and credit risk. Changes in market and economic conditions may 
affect the overall profitability of firms. Spread risk is thus related to both credit and market 
risk. Spreads can fluctuate either because conditions in capital markets change which affects 
credit spreads for all rating classes, or because the credit quality of an obligor has improved or 
deteriorated, or because of both factors. Another characterisation concerning capital-market 
measures is that market participants often anticipate forthcoming credit events before they 
actually happen. This means that spreads and yields already reflect the new credit status when 
the rating agencies downgrade an obligor. 
                                                 
14
 Bond yield is the return on a bond whereas bond spread refers to the difference between the yields of a 
corporate bond and a risk-free Treasury bond. 
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3.2 Underlying Factors Affecting Credit Ratings 
 
The empirical part of this thesis focuses largely on the financial statement information that is 
used in determining credit ratings. However, one must bear in mind that several factors in 
addition to financial statement information are taken into account when determining credit 
ratings. This section discusses the rating process and introduces the various determinants of 
credit ratings. 
 
Standard & Poor‟s (2008) states that its rating methodology is based on a fundamental 
analysis. The rating process is not limited to an examination of financial measures. On the 
contrary, proper evaluation of credit quality of an industrial company includes a thorough 
review of business fundamentals, including factors such as industry prospects for growth and 
vulnerability to technological change, labour unrest, or regulatory actions. For example, 
public finance ratings involve an evaluation of the basic underlying economic strength of the 
public entity, as well as the effectiveness of the management to address problems. As far as 
financial institutions are concerned, the reputation of the bank or company may have an 
impact on the future financial performance and the institution‟s ability to repay its obligations. 
The impact of various factors affecting credit ratings can thus vary between industries. 
Additionally, the rating agency emphasizes that, despite published methodologies, ratings 
incorporate many subjective judgements. 
 
More specifically, the analytical process of Standard & Poor‟s is organized according to a 
common framework. The rating process is divided into two broad areas. Rating analysis starts 
with a fundamental business analysis, followed by a financial analysis. Ratings can be 
provided only after quantitative, qualitative and legal analyses are performed. The analytical 
framework is thus divided further into several categories in order to take all key qualitative 
and quantitative issues into consideration. The categories underlying the business and 
financial risk assessments are: 
 
1. Business risk: Country risk, Industry factors, Competitive position, 
Profitability and peer group comparisons; and 
 
2. Financial risk: Governance, risk tolerance and financial policies, 
Accounting, Cash flow adequacy, Capital structure and asset protection, 
Liquidity and short-term factors. 
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Moody‟s (2007), on the other hand, states that quantitative factors altogether are assigned a 
weight of 70 % whereas the remaining 30 % is assigned to qualitative considerations. 
Moody‟s divides its rating process into the following categories in its Rating Methodology for 
Global Telecommunications Industry (2007): 
 
1. Size, scale, business model and competitive environment (relative weight 
of the rating factor: 25 %);  
 
2. Operating environment (20 %); 
 
3. Strategy and financial policies (5 %); 
 
4. Operating performance (10 %); and 
 
5. Financial strength (40 %). 
 
The first category includes size, scale, business model and competitive environment. 
According to Moody‟s (2007), the larger the scale, the less exposed the firm is to a regional 
weakness or a business downturn. A large scale also enhances the ability to confront an 
investment mistake. It eases a company‟s access to capital markets and may provide financing 
flexibility as well as competitive advantage. Furthermore, market leadership offers a superior 
access to customers relative to competitors. 
 
In terms of the business model, factors such as the extent of service territory and revenue mix 
are evaluated. Regarding the competitive environment, Moody‟s (2007) assesses market 
structure, customer count and revenue trends. The competitive environment is a key driver of 
credit quality since the degree of competition directly impacts a company‟s pricing power and 
marketing expenses, and hence the quality and level of its operating margins. The competitive 
environment is also likely to drive the level and pace of capital spending on adopting new 
technologies in order to differentiate product offerings or to reduce costs. 
 
Secondly, an evaluation of the operating environment consists of assessing regulatory, 
political and technology risks as well as market-share related considerations. The aim is to 
investigate whether there is external pressure on a company‟s performance and on its credit 
quality.  Regulation may primarily influence the competitive environment. Furthermore, 
Moody‟s (2007) considers how exposed the company is to a technological advancement and 
how it is positioned in handling technological developments. The strength within the market, 
on the other hand, influences customer perceptions of the company and signals of the use of 
capabilities to develop and support revenue. 
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Thirdly, when considering management‟s strategy, it is a key determinant of rating since it 
directly impacts the debt levels and credit quality. Moody‟s (2007) assesses the desired capital 
structure or targeted credit rating relative to the history, company‟s commitment to maintain 
targets as well as the operational and financial flexibility built by the management. Fourthly, 
the two key ratios of operating performance are EBITDA Margin and EBITDA Trend. The 
level and stability of operating margins are key considerations in the rating process. EBITDA 
margin captures management‟s skill in growing revenues, retaining customers and controlling 
costs whereas the trend in EBITDA measures the direction of earnings.  
 
Finally, an important part of the analytical process is to review the financial strength of a 
company, consisting of the ability to service debt as well as to generate cash and sufficient 
return to enable a continuous access to the capital markets. Moody‟s (2007) announces 5 key 
ratios measuring the financial strength of a company, namely Debt to EBITDA, Free Cash 
Flow to Debt, Retained Cash Flow to Debt, Funds from Operations plus Interest Expense to 
Interest Expense and EBITDA less Capital Expenditure to Interest Expense. The first ratio is 
an indicator of the debt level relative to operating cash flows. Debt payback ratios measure 
the ability to repay debt whereas the interest coverage ratios indicate a company‟s ability to 
cover interest expenses. 
 
In addition to the already mentioned ratios, Moody‟s globally comparable key ratios include 
Operating Profit, EBITA to Average Assets, EBITDA to Interest Expense, EBIT to Interest 
Expense, Debt to Revenues and Debt to Book Capitalization. Operating Profit and EBITA to 
Average Assets indicate the success of operating performance and the profitability of the core 
business of an enterprise. EBITDA and EBIT interest coverage ratios signal the extent of 
these operating performance measures relative to interest expenses. Debt to Revenues and 
Debt to Book Capitalization, on the other hand, are indicators of the debt level. Hence, it can 
be seen that the credit rating agency emphasizes the importance of operating performance as 
well as the ability to service debt and interest payments during the rating process, as far as 
financial ratios are concerned. 
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3.3 Analytical Financial Statement Adjustments as an Integral Part of the Rating 
Process 
 
It is a common practise that credit rating agencies perform adjustments to financial statement 
information during the rating process. Both Moody‟s (2006) and Standard & Poor‟s (2008) 
disclose their adjustments. Standard & Poor‟s (2008) states that the purpose of analytical 
adjustments is to better reflect reality and to minimize differences among companies. 
Adjustments are performed in order to produce an analysis of the best possible quality. The 
credit rating agency underlines that the objective of adjustments is to enhance the analytical 
value of financial data and not to measure compliance with rules. 
 
Moody‟s (2006), on the other hand, suggests four reasons for financial statement adjustments. 
Firstly, the aim is to apply accounting principles that Moody‟s (2006) believes more faithfully 
capture underlying economics. Secondly, the effects of unusual or non-recurring items are 
identified and separated. The third reason underlying adjustments is to improve comparability 
by aligning accounting principles. Finally, adjusted financial statements seek to reflect 
estimates or assumptions that Moody‟s believes are more prudent, for analytical purposes, in 
a company‟s particular circumstances. 
 
Moody‟s reports standard adjustments separately for financial statements under IFRS and US 
GAAP. Standard & Poor‟s (2008), on the other hand, discloses all possible adjustments and 
states that certain adjustments are routine and applied to many issuer for all periods, other 
adjustments are made on a specific industry basis, and that, at times, individual situations 
require the use of non-standard adjustments. 
 
The remainder of this section concentrates on introducing four standard adjustment types 
according to the rating methodology of Moody‟s (2006) for companies reporting under IFRS. 
Firstly, the accounting standard will be briefly referred to. The most common standard 
adjustment types were identified during the descriptive analysis of this research, described in 
more detail in Chapter 5. 
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3.3.1 Underfunded and Unfunded Defined Benefit Pensions 
 
“IAS 19 recognizes defined contribution plans and defined benefit plans as post-
employment benefit plans. Defined benefit plans may be unfunded or wholly or partly 
funded by contributions by an entity into an entity or a fund legally separate from the 
reporting entity. The reporting entity‟s obligation includes a guarantee regarding the 
specified return on the fund‟s assets. Actuarial risk and investment risk fall on the 
reporting entity.” (Troberg 2007, 72-73.) 
 
“The amount recognized as a defined benefit obligation in the balance sheet is the net 
total of 1) the present value of defined benefit obligation, 2) plus any actuarial gains 
(minus losses) not yet recognized, 3) minus any past service costs not yet recognized and 
4) minus the fair value of plan assets. The net of the following items is recognized as an 
expense in the income statement: 1) current service costs, 2) plus interest costs, 3) minus 
expected return on any plan assets, 4) plus actuarial losses (minus actuarial gains) and 5) 
plus past service costs.” (Troberg 2007, 75.) 
 
In a pre-funded defined benefit pension scheme companies are required to set aside assets in a 
separate trust to fund future benefits. In an unfunded defined benefit pension scheme 
companies are not required to set aside assets in a separate trust for future benefits. Moody‟s 
(2006) considers two types of reporting problems relating to pension accounting. The first 
problem affects both pension schemes whereas the second problem is unique to unfunded 
pension plans. 
 
Firstly, the economic obligation to the pension trust and employees is not often fully 
recognized because of the artificial smoothing mechanisms of pension accounting, permitting 
the deferral of large losses and gains. Also, cash contributions to the pension trust are reported 
as an operating cash outflow in the cash flow statement although the contribution is more like 
a reduction of debt, and thus a financing activity. 
 
Balance sheet is adjusted by recording as debt the unfunded or underfunded pension 
obligation
15
 and by removing all other pension assets and liabilities recognized under IFRS 
from the balance sheet. Regarding income statement, the goal is to report pension expense 
without artificial smoothing. Firstly, all pension costs recognized under IFRS are cancelled. 
The pension expense recognized by Moody‟s equals the year‟s service cost plus interest on 
the gross pension obligation minus actual earnings on plan assets. The service cost is 
considered as an operating cost of the pension plan. Interest cost on the gross pension 
obligation is recognized in other non-recurring income/expense. Furthermore, interest 
expense to pension-related debt is reclassified from other non-recurring income/expense to 
                                                 
15
 defined as actuarially determined defined benefit obligation – fair value of assets in the pension trust 
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interest expense. In addition, actual losses or gains on pension assets are recorded in other 
non-recurring income/expense. The volatility in the performance of the pension plan assets is 
no longer reflected in EBIT as Moody‟s excludes the item other non-recurring 
income/expense from EBIT. 
 
Cash flow statement is adjusted so that only the service cost is recognized as an operating 
cash outflow and employer cash pension contributions in excess of the service costs are 
reclassified from an operating cash outflow to a financing cash outflow. Additionally, 
Moody‟s (2006) investigates the premises for the discount rate and the assumed rate of return 
on pension assets when these assumptions appear significantly different from the peer 
companies. 
 
Secondly, countries with an unfunded pension system differ significantly from those with a 
pre-funded system in the following way. Balance sheet includes a gross pension obligation in 
the place of a net obligation. Furthermore, there is typically no statutory requirement for cash 
pre-funding of the gross obligation. Finally, these arrangements allow for a long time to deal 
with the actual funding of pension payments, offering companies flexibility in how to meet 
their obligations. 
 
Balance sheet is adjusted so that Moody‟s simulates a pre-funding of pension obligations and 
assumes that management‟s targeted debt and equity mix will be used to fund future pension 
obligations. Moody‟s reverses a portion of the debt and incorporates a corresponding “equity 
credit” which reduces the amount of the gross pension obligation. Equity credit is calculated 
after excess liquid funds have been reduced from the defined benefit obligation since excess 
liquid funds reduce the likelihood for raising additional equity finance. Regarding income 
statement, interest expense is aligned with the adjustment to debt. 
 
The IASB is currently working on a project to improve pension accounting significantly, 
leading to a fundamental review concerning all aspects of post-employment benefit 
accounting. The project is part of the 2006 Memorandum of Understanding between the 
FASB and the IASB. 
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3.3.2 Operating Leases 
 
According to IAS 17, in a finance (or capital) lease the risks and rewards of ownership 
are transferred to lessee. All other leases are operating leases. A finance lease is 
recognized at fair value of the leased property as assets and liabilities on the financial 
statements of the lessee. The lessor reports a finance lease as receivables. An operating 
lease is recognized as an expense by the lessee and as an income by the lessor.  
 
There are a number of reasons to adjust operating leases. Firstly, companies do not recognize 
debt on their balance sheet even though they have contractual obligations to make lease 
payments. A failure in lease payments often leads to events of default. Secondly, operating 
leases reduce a company‟s borrowing capacity from the view point of lenders. Thirdly, the 
company would be likely to resort to borrowing money and buying the asset without any 
leasing option. As a consequence, Moody‟s (2006) reproduces company‟s financial 
statements as if the company had bought the leased asset and financed it with debt. 
 
Balance sheet is adjusted by increasing both debt and fixed assets. Income statement is 
adjusted by reclassifying one third of the rent expense to interest expense and considering the 
residual amount (2/3) as depreciation. Operating expenses are adjusted accordingly. Cash 
flow statement is adjusted by reclassifying a portion of the rent payments from an operating 
cash flow to a financing cash outflow. Capital expenditures for newly acquired assets under 
operating leases are calculated and recorded in investing cash flows and as a corresponding 
borrowing in financing cash flow to fund the capital expenditures. 
 
Developing a common approach to lease accounting is one of the projects being part of the 
2006 Memorandum of Understanding between the FASB and the IASB. The Boards have 
jointly issued a discussion paper for comments in March 2009. A final standard is envisaged 
for issuance in 2011. 
 
3.3.3 Consistent Measurement of Funds from Operations (FFO) 
 
Two methods of reporting cash flows from operating activities are allowed under IAS 7. 
In the direct method gross cash receipts and payments are reported by major classes. In 
the indirect method, profit or loss is adjusted for non-cash revenues and expenses 
included in the profit or loss. IAS 7 encourages the use of the direct method. 
 
Under the indirect method companies have the freedom the use net income, operating profit 
or pre-tax profit as the starting point for the calculation of the cash flow from operating 
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activities. FFO represents cash from operations before changes in working capital. Moody‟s 
adjusts the working capital of those companies who use operating profit or pre-tax profit as 
the starting point for their cash flow statement to make the calculations consistent with those 
companies that start with net income. The adjustments only concern cash flow statement. 
 
If the starting point is pre-tax income, working capital is adjusted by the difference between 
current tax expense and tax paid. If the starting point is operating profit, working capital is 
adjusted by the difference between 1) current tax expense and tax paid and by the difference 
between 2) net interest expense and net interest paid. 
 
3.3.4 Unusual and Non-recurring Items 
 
IAS 1 does not allow the presentation of extraordinary items. 
 
Moody‟s aims at separating the effects of unusual and non-recurring items to a special 
category on the income and cash flow statements. The unusual and non-recurring items are 
identified from public disclosures as well as during management‟s discussions and the 
analysis of operations. The analytical ratios generally exclude the effects of unusual and non-
recurring items. 
 
Balance sheet is adjusted only when an unusual or non-recurring item may materially affect 
the analysis. Income statement is adjusted by reclassifying the revenues, gains or costs 
relating to the unusual or non-recurring item net of tax effect to a separate category below net 
profit after tax. Cash flow statement is adjusted by reclassifying the effects of unusual or non-
recurring cash inflows and outflows to a special category in the operating section of the cash 
flow statement. 
 
3.4 The Role of Financial Statement Information Quality in the Rating Process 
 
Assessing the quality of financial statement information is a critical part of the credit rating 
process. Standard & Poor‟s states in its Corporate Ratings Criteria (2008) that credit ratings 
are based on information furnished by the obligors or obtained from other sources the credit 
rating agency considers reliable. Financial statements and related disclosures serve as the 
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primary source of information used in the rating process regarding the financial condition and 
financial performance. Information is considered critically but no audit is performed during 
the rating process. The first step is to determine whether the financial statement information 
can be used to measure appropriately the performance and position of a company relative 
other companies. After the review, analytical adjustments, discussed in the previous section, 
are made to the amounts reported in the financial statements. 
 
Generally investors in the secondary market for corporate bonds find it difficult to observe a 
firm‟s assets directly because of noisy or delayed accounting reports or barriers to monitoring. 
Instead, investors must rely on the available accounting data and other publicly available 
information that would signal about the issuer‟s credit quality. (Duffie & Lando, 2001.) 
 
The manipulation of accounting data is intended to make a firm appear less risky. Financial 
executives state that they try to meet earnings benchmarks as well as to achieve and preserve 
a desired credit rating. Evidence suggests that earnings management is more common for 
firms that are large and have a high credit rating. (Graham, Harvey & Rajgopal, 2005.) 
Moreover, Jorion et al. (2007) states that investment-grade firms have higher capabilities to 
manage earnings due to the scale of their operations and access to exotic financing sources. 
Additionally, an increased number of institutional investors in large companies may create 
pressures to meet and beat the market expectations. 
 
With perfect information, yield spreads for surviving firms are zero at zero maturity and are 
relatively small for small maturities, regardless of the riskiness of the firm. For relatively 
risky firms, yield spreads climb rapidly with maturity with perfect information. Regarding 
imperfect information, yield spreads are strictly positive at zero maturity because of investors‟ 
uncertainty. Duffie and Lando (2001) shows that imprecision in accounting measures of firm 
value increases default risk. This implies that a declining quality of financial statement 
information would lead to a greater default risk and a higher debt yield spread. Also Francis, 
LaFond, Olsson and Shipper (2005) demonstrates that greater information risk is associated 
with higher debt costs. 
 
The research of Jorion et al. (2007) demonstrates the critical role of accounting information in 
the credit rating process. The research strongly disagrees with the research paper published by 
Blume, Lim and MacKinlay (1998) whose main finding was that the reason for the average 
credit rating of US corporations trending down has been a systematic tightening of credit 
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rating standards on the behalf of credit rating agencies. The decline in average credit ratings is 
an observed phenomenon over the last twenty years but Jorion et al. (2007) re-examines its 
causes. Blume et al. (1998) has influenced the views of academics, practitioners and 
regulators on rating consistency. For instance, it has been quoted by the Federal Reserve 
Board in 2001 and the Federal Reserve Bank in 2003 in their research reports. However, a 
tightening of credit standards by rating agencies could undermine the usefulness of credit 
ratings and have an adverse impact on the cost of debt financing. Changes in the rating 
criteria that do not reflect changes in underlying default probabilities would distort the 
effectiveness of credit ratings since their usefulness depends critically on consistency in the 
credit rating standards. On the other hand, Jorion et al. (2007) argues that the interpretations 
of Blume et al. (1998) of tightening standards can be explained by changes in the quality of 
financial statement information over time. Jorion et al. (2007) states that, in addition to 
industry-specific factors and the increased risk of firms over time, the quality of financial 
statement information is an important determinant of credit rating. 
 
Jorion et al. (2007) finds that financial statement information may have become less reliable 
over time because of increased earnings management. The paper documents for the first time 
notable temporal differences in the value relevance of accounting information and earnings 
management between investment-grade and speculative-grade firms. More specifically, the R-
squared is halved over the observation period for investment-grade issuers. Decreasing credit 
quality is associated with lower values of the R-squares. This indicates that accounting 
information is progressively becoming less useful to predict credit ratings for investment-
grade firms. Yet, the same pattern is not observed for speculative-grade issuers. 
 
As rating agencies are faced with less informative accounting numbers, the average rating 
decreases over time. This is consistent with Duffie and Lando (2001). The analyses of Jorion 
et al. (2007) indicate that for the investment-grade firms, upward earnings management is 
associated with lower credit rating. When firms become more aggressive in implementing 
accounting rules, they tend to portray a much rosier picture than their true underlying 
economics. As a rational response, rating agencies discount the reported accounting data and 
assign lower ratings to accurately reflect the firms‟ economic reality. As indicated by Graham 
et al. (2005), earnings management is more prevalent for firms that are large and have a high 
credit rating, corresponding to the investment-grade sample of Jorion et al. (2007). 
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3.5 Modelling Credit Ratings 
 
This thesis investigates the association between financial statement adjustments and credit 
ratings by using credit rating models. This section introduces now the premises for such 
models. Prior research demonstrates that a part of the credit rating process can be modelled 
and explained as a function of financial ratios, without incorporating human judgement. 
Furthermore, Palepu et al. (2007, 414) states that in situations where a public rating is not 
available some rating agencies relay on quantitative models. Such models are commonly used 
by insurance companies and banks to assess the riskiness of debt issues.  
 
3.5.1 The Rating Models of Kaplan and Urwitz (1979) 
 
The research of Kaplan and Urwitz (1979) attempts to determine what information bond 
raters use in making their judgement by constructing statistical models for explaining and 
predicting credit ratings. The rating models of Kaplan and Urwitz have been widely used in 
the literature as such, and furthermore, the methodology has been extensively referred to as a 
basis for credit rating modelling (for instance Blume et al., 1998; Jorion et al., 2007). 
 
Based on prior research, Kaplan and Urwitz (1979) states that relatively simple functions on 
historical and publicly available data can be used as an excellent first approximation for the 
bond-rating process. A number of studies from the 1960s and 70s were able to develop a 
statistical model capable of classifying 60 % - 80 % of the bonds correctly in a holdout 
sample different from the one used to estimate the statistical function.  However, the studies 
differed in the statistical procedure used to estimate the prediction equation, the selection of 
the independent variables, the population of bonds used to estimate the prediction equation 
and in the method for evaluating the predictions from the model. 
 
Kaplan and Urwitz (1979) views the bond-rating process in the following way. A bond rater 
tries to measure the probability of default of a bond issue. However, due to inadequate 
measurement techniques the rater cannot measure default risk on a ratio or interval scale but 
can only make an ordinal ranking of the bond issues. Ex post, bond raters hope that low-rated 
bonds are in default more often relative to high-rated bonds. The different values of the 
dependent variable represent ordinal information that is not necessarily linear in scale. For 
example, AAA bonds are less risky than AA bonds but there is no quantitative measure of 
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how much less risky they are. Kaplan and Urwitz (1979) uses the maximum likelihood 
approach for estimating the bond rating equation. The research (1979) uses two separate 
samples: 1) all Moody‟s rated industrial bonds with unchanged ratings in the 1971-1972 time 
period (“seasoned bonds”) and 2) all new industrial issues rated by Moody‟s between 1970-
1974 (“new bonds”). The new-issue sample is further split up into an estimation sample and a 
holdout sample. 
 
Studies prior to Kaplan and Urwitz (1979) have shown that a relatively small set of 
independent variables seems important in explaining and predicting bond ratings. All 
financial ratios are computed using a 5-year arithmetic average of the annual ratios because 
the authors believe that bond raters look beyond a single year‟s data to avoid temporary 
anomalies. The variables being part of the analyses of Kaplan and Urwitz (1979) measure 
subordination status, size, earnings stability, leverage, earnings coverage of interest and 
profitability. In addition, the residual standard error from the market model and the market 
beta are included as independent variables to test whether bond ratings are more associated 
with firm-specific or unsystematic risk than systematic risk. The analyses include the 
following variables: 
 
- Subordination status: a dummy variable (S) 
 
- Size: Total Assets (TA) and Size of Bond Issue (IS) 
 
- Earnings stability: Coefficient of Variation of Total Assets (CVTA) and Coefficient of 
Variation of Net Income (CVNI) 
 
- Leverage: Long-term Debt to Total Assets (LTD/TA) and Long-term Debt to Net 
Worth (LTD/NW) 
 
- Earnings coverage of interest: Cash Flow Before Interest and Taxes to Interest Charges 
(CFBIT/INT) and Cash Flow Before Interest and Taxes to Total Debt (CFBIT/TD) 
 
- Profitability: Net Income to Total Assets (NI/TA) 
 
- Unsystematic risk: Residual Standard Error from the Market Model (σM) 
 
- Systematic risk: Market Beta (βM) 
 
Kaplan and Urwitz (1979) finds that the subordination status and size variables are highly 
significant for both groups of bonds in explaining credit ratings. The financial leverage 
variable Long-term Debt to Total Assets is also significant. Surprisingly, the interest coverage 
cash flow variables are consistently insignificant, although emphasized by credit rating 
analysts. In addition, the following three rating models are selected for further cross-
validation purposes from the models estimated on the new-issue sample: 
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1. M1: Rating = f(CFBIT/INT, LTD/TA, NI/TA, TA, S, βM, σM) 
 
2. M2: Rating = f(LTD/TA, TA, S, βM) 
 
3. M3: Rating = f(LTD/TA, NI/TA, TA, S) 
 
The models estimated on the original estimation sample of new issues are used to predict the 
ratings for the holdout sample of new issues. Model 1 which includes both financial and 
market-determined risk measures performs best of the three models: 69 % of the predicted 
ratings are correct. With Models 2 and 3, 66 % and 54 % of the predictions are correct, 
respectively. Both models 1 and 2 predict 100 % of the issues within one category of the 
correct rating. These findings suggest that a statistical model (M2) consisting of subordination 
status, size (Total Assets), one financial ratio (Long-term Debt to Total Assets) and the 
Common Stock Market Beta coefficient can classify correctly about 2/3 of a holdout sample 
of newly issued bonds. The prediction capacity can be improved a bit further by adding two 
financial ratios and the residual standard error from the market model (M1). 
 
Finally, Kaplan and Urwitz (1979) evaluates the performance of the above rating prediction 
models by observing the actual market yields of the newly issued bonds and by comparing the 
yields to the predicted ratings. They believe that the market is capable of evaluating bonds 
independently of the bond raters and adjusting yields to compensate bond holders for the 
perceived riskiness of individual bonds. This may not always agree with the risk assigned by 
the credit rating agency. Market yield comparisons indicate that the actual performance of the 
models in capturing the riskiness of bonds is probably even better than indicated by the 
percentages of correctly classified bonds. The analysis reveals that the models may predict the 
actual risk of a bond better than the rating agency in about half of the misclassifications. 
However, the research acknowledges that such a comparison is a rather crude mechanism 
since bonds are complicated instruments and one cannot separate the different and unique 
features of bonds, including for instance coupon rate and maturity, from the yield differential 
due solely to risk. 
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3.5.2 The Importance of Market-based Information 
 
The variables used in the empirical part of this study are accounting variables. However, prior 
research shows that the explanatory power of bankruptcy prediction models can be enhanced 
if market-related data is used as well. Credit rating and bankruptcy literature are related. 
Indeed, bankruptcy, or default, can be seen as a special case of a downgrade. The credit 
quality has then deteriorated to the point where the obligor cannot service its debt obligations 
anymore. (Crouchy et al., 2000.) This section discusses the importance of market-based 
information. 
 
Chava and Jarrow (2004) states that market variables appear to predict bankruptcy better than 
accounting variables. The most accurate public firm model in terms of forecasting includes no 
accounting variables. Accounting variables add little predictive power when market variables 
are already included in the bankruptcy model. The finding is consistent with the efficient 
market hypothesis. Market prices reflect all publicly available information regarding 
bankruptcy, including that contained in the accounting variables.  
 
Beaver, McNichols and Rhie (2005) finds that the slight decline in the predictive ability of the 
financial ratios in predicting bankruptcy is offset by improvement in the predictive ability of 
market-related variables. Non-financial statement information thus compensates for the slight 
loss in the predictive power of the financial ratios. When combining financial and market-
based ratios, the market-based variables remain significant even in the presence of the 
financial statement variables. This is consistent with the notion that the market-based 
variables contain the financial statement variables as a subset, as suggested previously by 
Chava and Jarrow (2004). Leverage also remains significant. This is because the market-
based variables do not distinguish between volatility caused by business risk and that caused 
by financial risk. 
 
Campbell, Hilscher and Szilagyi (2008) suggests that the explanatory power of the 
bankruptcy regression model is improved by scaling accounting variables by market values. 
When the time horizon at which failure is predicted is increased, the most persistent 
forecasting variable, market capitalization, becomes relatively more important as failure is 
predicted further into the future. Volatility and the market-to-book ratio also become more 
important at long horizons relative to net income, leverage and recent equity returns. 
Hillegeist, Keating, Cram and Lundstedt (2004), on the other hand, assesses the performance 
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of two popular accounting-based measures, Altman‟s Z-score and Ohlson‟s O-score, and 
evaluates whether they can effectively summarize publicly available information about the 
probability of bankruptcy. The relative information content of these scores is compared to a 
market-based measure of the probability of bankruptcy. The results indicate that the latter 
provides significantly more information than either of the two accounting-based measures. 
 
Indeed, the use of market-based information includes several advantages. Three of them are 
now presented. Firstly, as mentioned, market prices reflect a rich and comprehensive mix of 
information which includes financial statement data as a subset. Market-based variables are 
not a substitute for the accounting-based information but rather a proxy for the predictive 
power attainable by capturing the total mix of information. (Beaver et al., 2005.) 
 
Secondly, the ability of accounting-based information to estimate the probability of 
bankruptcy accurately and reliably is limited by the very nature of the information. To begin 
with, market-based variables can be measured with a finer partition of time while financial 
statements are available at best on a quarterly basis (Beaver et al., 2005). Additionally, an 
estimate for the probability of bankruptcy is a statement about the likelihood of a future event 
whereas the financial statements are designed to measure past performance and may not be 
very informative about the future of the firm. Furthermore, financial statements are 
formulated under the going-concern principle, which assumes that firms will not go bankrupt. 
Finally, the conservatism principle causes asset values to be understated relative to their 
market values, especially for fixed assets and intangibles. Downward-biased asset valuations 
will cause accounting-based leverage measures to be overstated. (Hillegeist et al., 2004.) 
 
Thirdly, market-based variables can provide direct measures of volatility (Beaver et al., 
2005). The probability of bankruptcy increases with volatility. Accounting-based bankruptcy 
prediction models fail to incorporate a measure of asset volatility which is a crucial variable 
in predicting bankruptcy because it captures the likelihood that the value of the firm‟s assets 
will decline to such an extent that the firm will be unable to repay its debt. (Hillegeist et al., 
2004.) 
 
Regarding the development of accounting-based information, Beaver et al. (2005) lists three 
forces that have influenced the predictive value of financial ratios with respect to bankruptcy 
over the past 40 years. First, the FASB and the SEC have been trying to increase the 
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usefulness of the financial statement information and to enhance the ability of such statements 
to convey the fair value of assets and liabilities. The use of fair values might increase the 
predictive ability of financial statements for bankruptcy. Second, the shift in economic 
activities towards intangible assets might offset the improvement in accounting standards 
since they are not well captured by the current accounting models. Third, financial statements 
may be more managed today than in the past. This brings the discussion back to the theme of 
Chapter 2. Although having been the subject of many improvements lately, reporting 
standards and the resulting financial statement information are influenced by several different 
factors. Most importantly, the incentives of those who demand and supply information have a 
major impact on the quality of the outcome. This clearly decreases the usefulness of 
accounting-based information in the favour of market-based information. 
 
 
4 HYPOTHESIS 
 
This thesis investigates whether financial statement adjustments matter in credit analysis. The 
empirical part of the thesis is constructed so that it begins with examining the difference 
between reported and adjusted data, then goes on to explain the quality differences between 
the two sets of data and finally concludes by investigating the association financial statement 
adjustments and credit ratings. Two related questions are addressed during the analyses, in 
order to answer the research question. 
 
1. Are reporting standards and company-specific factors associated with financial statement 
adjustments? 
 
Examining the first question offers descriptive evidence on reporting standards and company-
specific factors and on their association with financial statement adjustments. The amount of 
adjustments is explained by constructing a regression model. US GAAP being the benchmark 
standards, the GAAP dummies included in the regression model are IFRS and LOCALGAAP. 
The coefficients of IFRS and LOCALGAAP are interpreted in relation to US GAAP. 
Therefore, if the coefficient of a GAAP dummy is positive, a change from US GAAP to the 
other GAAP increases the amount of adjustments. The firm-specific variables included in the 
model are identified from the credit rating and accounting quality literature. 
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Regression model: 
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2. Are financial statement adjustments associated with actual credit ratings? 
 
In the context of credit ratings, financial statement adjustments can be considered from two 
different viewpoints. Firstly, assume that company Y discloses its financial statements and 
requests a credit rating from Credit Rating Agency X. However, the latter cannot determine 
the rating based on reported financial statement amounts but has to make adjustments to better 
reflect the underlying economics. If the reported financial statement figures are not of 
sufficient quality, the adjusted figures must be better for the purposes of a rating process. The 
more there are adjustments the lower the quality of the original amounts must be, since there 
is more need for corrections. The lower quality of reported financial statement information 
leads to a lower rating. Thus, adjustments are negatively associated with ratings and the 
adjustment variable can be seen as a measure of financial statement information quality. 
 
However, the other way of looking at adjustments is that they must be useful for the decision 
making during the rating process. As adjustments make companies more comparable with 
each other, they decrease information risk. This improves the usefulness financial statement 
information and leads to a higher rating. In this case, adjustments are positively associated 
with ratings. 
 
All in all, it is expected that adjustments are associated with credit ratings but the direction of 
the association is not clear. The research hypothesis is thus: 
  
H1: The amount of financial statement adjustments is associated with credit rating. 
 
The variable measuring the amount of adjustments is added to a linear regression model 
explaining credit ratings. Moreover, interaction terms for financial statement adjustments and 
reporting standards are included in the rating model to take into account the effect of IFRS 
and local GAAP adjustments on rating. The amount of adjustments variable measures the 
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effect of US GAAP adjustments since the interaction terms clean out the effect of IFRS and 
local GAAP adjustments. The two interaction terms, on the other hand, measure the impact of 
IFRS and local GAAP adjustments on rating relative to US GAAP. 
 
Regression model: 






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sAdjustmentIFRSsAdjustmentRating
c
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     (2) 
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5 DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
The empirical part of this thesis is divided into two chapters. To begin with, Chapter 5 
introduces the data and various descriptive statistics relating to the data as well as the 
variables used in the analyses. Chapter 6, on the other hand, describes the tests performed and 
reports the results. 
 
5.1 Data 
 
Two sets of data are used in the empirical part of this research, both provided by Credit 
Rating Agency X. Firstly, the main data consists of the time period 2004-2007 including 
companies active in the telecommunications industry. Secondly, the IFRS firms included in 
the main data are analyzed more thoroughly in terms of the adjustment type using a subset of 
the main data from year 2007. 
 
5.1.1 Main Data 2004–2007 
 
The original data consists of 196 firms from the time period 2004-2007. The data contains 4 
different report types. Report 1 contains balance sheet information, Report 2 income 
statement and cash flow statement information, Report 3 rating related information and 
Report 4 numerous accounting ratios calculated on the basis of Reports 1 and 2. Reports 1, 2 
and 4 include both reported and adjusted financial statement figures. 
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A few companies were removed from the original data, leaving altogether 191 companies and 
764 firm-year observations in the data. Two of the removed companies were included only in 
Reports 1, 2 and 4. Three of the removed companies were included only in Report 3. One 
company was further removed from the data at the beginning of the analyses since its reported 
and adjusted revenues differed significantly from each other. The analyses in Chapter 6 will 
only use observations with an existing credit rating. Of the 764 observations left in the data, 
515 have an existing rating. 
 
There are 53 countries included in the data. Altogether 52 companies report under IFRS, 84 
under US GAAP and 55 under a local GAAP. The distribution of countries relative to 
reporting standard is illustrated in Appendix 1. 
 
5.1.2 Data 2007 with Specific Adjustments 
 
The data set from 2007 with specific adjustments contains 195 companies, out of which 52 
are IFRS companies, 87 US GAAP companies and 56 local GAAP companies. The 
companies included in the 2007 data are the same ones as in the main data described above. 
The IFRS companies included in the 2007 data will be examined more closely. Eight IFRS 
companies were removed from the data because their reporting date exceeded +/- 6 months 
from 31.12.2007. As a consequence, 44 IFRS companies are left under examination. 
 
The 2007 data contains specific adjustments for balance sheet, income statement and cash 
flow statement divided into standard and non-standard adjustment categories. Standard 
adjustments are further categorized as follows: 
 
1. Pensions; 
 
2. Operating leases; 
 
3. Financial leases; 
 
4. Capitalized interest; 
 
5. Capitalized development costs; 
 
6. Interest expense related to discounted long-term liabilities other than debt; 
 
7. Capitalized maintenance costs; 
 
8. Stock compensation; 
 
9. Hybrids; 
 
10. Securitizations; 
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11. Consistent measurement of FFO; and 
  
12. Unusual and non-recurring items. 
 
Non-standard adjustments, on the other hand, are made whenever Credit Rating Agency X 
considers it necessary for the purposes of the rating process. The company-specific reasons 
underlying non-standard adjustments include, for instance, guarantees in favour of third 
parties, reclassification of Depreciation & Amortization, provisions for legal cases as well as 
the removal of equity-accounted income from EBIT and EBITDA. 
 
5.2 Descriptive Statistics 
 
This section illustrates the descriptive statistics relating both to the main data from 2004-2007 
and the data from 2007. The difference between the reported and adjusted data is first 
investigated and the most common adjustment types are taken under examination. The section 
then goes on to introduce the variables as well as the models used during the analyses. 
 
5.2.1 Difference between Reported and Adjusted Data 
 
The first question of interest is whether the difference between reported and adjusted data is 
significant. The purpose is to identify those financial statement items which are most 
commonly adjusted. The financial statement items are evaluated with the ultimate objective of 
constructing variables describing the amount of adjustments. 
 
Searching for Adjusted Financial Statement Items from the Main Data 2004-2007 
 
The starting point for analyzing adjustments is to view a table illustrating the difference 
between adjusted and reported data (ADJ – REP) deflated with reported Total Assets and 
containing all the financial statement items. Appendices 2 and 3 represent the descriptive 
statistics of the proportioned difference for balance sheet items as well as those for income 
and cash flow statement items, respectively. Only rated companies are included in the 
analyses and included in the appendices. At a first glance, especially items such as Property, 
Plant and Equipment, Capitalized Leases, Debt, Interest Paid and Market and Book 
Capitalization stand out from the rest of the items when using the median of the deflated 
difference as a criterion. 
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Next, a non-parametric Wilcoxon test
16
 is performed on all of the financial statement items. In 
order to perform the test, all financial statement items from the raw data are deflated with 
reported Total Assets. The test is then conducted between adjusted financial statement items 
deflated with reported Total Assets and their corresponding reported financial statement items 
deflated with reported Total Assets. The aim is to see whether the difference between adjusted 
and reported financial statement items is statistically significant. The Wilcoxon test statistic Z 
is illustrated in Appendices 2 and 3 along with other descriptive statistics. Items having a 
statistically significant difference between adjusted and reported data are indicated with an 
asterisk. 
 
Altogether 118 financial statement items have a statistically significant difference between 
adjusted and reported data with the Wilcoxon test (1). Since so many financial statement 
items have a significant difference, the focus is on the median of the deflated difference, while 
searching for items with a median above 5 % (2). Together these two criteria are used to 
determine important adjusted financial statement items to be tested further. At this point, all 
the sum items
17
 as well as items having a similar content
18
 are eliminated. The sum items are 
eliminated because, for the purposes of credit analysis, it is more interesting to investigate 
which individual financial statement items are adjusted, and later to see which adjustment 
types cause the adjustments of these individual financial statement items. The deflated 
differences are further transformed into absolute values.
19
 This is because during the analyses, 
the absolute deflated differences will be used as variables describing the amount of 
adjustments. When considering the median of absolute deflated differences, the same 
financial statement items stand out as before taking the absolute value. 
 
According to the methodology of credit rating agencies, operating performance as well as 
debt payback and interest coverage are important considerations during the rating process. 
The financial statement items relating to these key considerations, namely Cash Flow from 
Operations, EBITDA, Operating Profit and EBIT for operating performance, Total Debt for 
debt payback and Interest Expense for interest coverage, also have a significant difference 
between adjusted and reported data with the Wilcoxon test. However, only Total Debt has a 
                                                 
16
 The Wilcoxon signed-ranks method tests the null hypothesis that two related medians are the same. Two tests 
of normality were conducted in order to make sure that the Wilcoxon test suits better to the data over a t-test. 
Both Kolmogorov-Smirnova and Shapiro-Wilk tests indicate that the items are not close to a normal distribution. 
17
 such as Total Assets 
18
 for instance Total Debt is selected and other debt items disregarded 
19
 for example | [(EBITADJ – EBITREP) / Total AssetsREP] | 
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median above 5 %, together with Capitalized Leases and Net Property, Plant and Equipment. 
At this point, the items indicated by the rating methodology are selected further. For operating 
performance all the 4 items mentioned above are selected as alternatives to be tested during 
the regression analyses. However, Operating Profit constantly generates a higher explanatory 
power relative to the alternatives during the analyses and is therefore selected over the other 
candidates. Moreover, Capitalized Leases and Net Property, Plant and Equipment have a very 
high correlation with Total Debt and Interest Expenses and are therefore eliminated.
20
 Thus, 
the variables to be used later in Chapter 6 as measures describing the amount of adjustments 
include the absolute deflated difference of Operating Profit, Interest Expense and Total Debt. 
 
Although the variables are constructed as absolute values, a review of the sign, or direction, of 
adjustments is important. Table 1 illustrates the number of the positive and negative 
adjustments of the three selected items, Operating Profit, Interest Expense and Total Debt, 
according to reporting standard. The table shows that a major part of the adjustments are 
positive. This means that the adjustments made by Credit Rating Agency X to a large extent 
increase Operating Profit, Interest Expense and Total Debt compared to the reported financial 
statement figures. On the one hand, when comparing different reporting standards, the 
negative Operating Profit adjustments are higher under US GAAP and IFRS than those under 
a local GAAP (17.2 %, 19.5 % and 8.8 %, respectively). On the other hand, local GAAP 
companies experience more negative adjustments in Interest Expense in comparison to 
companies reporting under US GAAP and IFRS (10.5 %, 3.3 % and 2.3 %, respectively). The 
sensitivity tests will include an analysis taking into account the sign of adjustments. 
 
 
                                                 
20
 Correlations with Total Debt and Interest Expense, respectively: Capitalized Leases 84.7 % / 75.5 % and Net 
Property, Plant and Equipment 84.6 % / 74.4 % with Spearman‟s correlation; Capitalized Leases 83.4 % / 60.9 
% and Net Property, Plant and Equipment 83.3 % / 60.3 % with Pearson‟s correlation. Correlations were taken 
from the absolute deflated differences. 
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Financial Statement Item Positive % of Total Negative % of Total Total
US GAAP
Operating Profit 178 82.8 % 37 17.2 % 215
Interest Expense 208 96.7 % 7 3.3 % 215
Total Debt 208 96.7 % 7 3.3 % 215
IFRS
Operating Profit 103 80.5 % 25 19.5 % 128
Interest Expense 125 97.7 % 3 2.3 % 128
Total Debt 127 99.2 % 1 0.8 % 128
LOCALGAAP
Operating Profit 104 91.2 % 10 8.8 % 114
Interest Expense 102 89.5 % 12 10.5 % 114
Total Debt 114 100.0 % 0 0.0 % 114
ALL
Operating Profit 385 84.2 % 72 15.8 % 457
Interest Expense 435 95.2 % 22 4.8 % 457
Total Debt 449 98.2 % 8 1.8 % 457
Sign of Adjustments
TABLE 1
Number of Positive and Negative Adjustments Relative to Reporting Standard
 
 
The reason why several financial statement items will be used as a measure for the amount of 
adjustments is that there is no theory to indicate how to calculate such a variable. Operating 
performance, debt payback and interest coverage are key components during a rating process 
and the evidence from the Wilcoxon test shows that in reality these items are also highly 
adjusted. Furthermore, it is important to consider several variables instead of just one since 
the impact of different types of adjustments on different financial statement items varies. 
 
However, in addition to the mentioned three key rating components, two other variables are 
constructed to measure the amount of adjustments. Contrary to the three variables discussed 
above, these two ratios take into account the total amount of financial statement adjustments. 
The first variable will be based on the total sum of adjustments in absolute values deflated 
with reported Total Assets. The second variable, on the other hand, will describe the relative 
number of adjustments. Using these two variables together with the three other variables 
taking into account only the adjustments of one financial statement item will enable a deeper 
understanding of adjustments and their effect on credit ratings. 
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Searching for Adjusted Financial Statement Items from the 2007 Data 
 
Additionally, the 2007 adjustment data is examined in order to see which financial statement 
items are mostly adjusted. Appendices 4, 5 and 6 illustrate the amount of standard 
adjustments, non-standard adjustments as well as the sum of these two amounts separately for 
balance sheet, income statement and cash flow statement, respectively. Furthermore, the 
adjustment types underlying standard adjustments can be seen in the tables. The number of 
standard adjustment type refers to the list of different adjustments types put forward in section 
5.1.2 Data 2007 with Specific Adjustments
21
. Only those items that face adjustments are a part 
of the appendices. The total amount of standard adjustments, the total amount of non-standard 
adjustments as well as the sum of the two (“ALL”) are proportioned to the total amount of 
reported Total Assets of the 44 IFRS firms. The percentages used in the text refer to the 
amount of adjustments relative to reported Total Assets. The specific adjustments were 
converted into absolute values before calculating the sum items. 
 
When considering the adjustments performed to balance sheet items in Appendix 4
22
, Gross 
Property, Plant and Equipment and Capitalized Leases stand out from the rest of the items. 
The relative amount of adjustments of both of these items equals 6.9 %. This percentage is 
remarkably high compared to other financial statement items. The adjustments are standard 
adjustments and mainly due to operating leases (2). Moreover, the adjustments of Bonds / 
Senior Debt account for 1.9 % relative to Total Assets whereas those of Other Long-term 
Liabilities equal 1.3 %. Both of the items face standard adjustments due to pensions (1). The 
item Bonds / Senior Debt faces also a large amount of non-standard adjustments (1.0 %). In 
addition, other balance sheet items facing a great amount of adjustments due to operating 
leases are Current Portion of Borrowings / Long-term Debt (0.6 %) and Less: Current 
Maturities (0.6 %). A major part of the balance sheet adjustments are standard; the total 
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1) Pensions; 2) Operating leases; 3) Financial leases; 4) Capitalized interest; 5) Capitalized development costs; 
6) Interest expense related to discounted long-term liabilities other than debt; 7) Capitalized maintenance costs; 
8) Stock compensation; 9) Hybrids; 10) Securitizations; 11) Consistent measurement of FFO; and 12) Unusual 
and non-recurring items. 
22
 The following balance sheet items are not a part of the table as the amount of adjustments equals 0: 
Accumulated Depreciation, Net Property Plant and Equipment, Investment in Subsidiaries / Affiliates, Goodwill, 
Deferred Tax Assets, NON-CURRENT ASSETS, Inventories, Trade Receivables, Other Receivables, 
CURRENT ASSETS, ASSETS IN DISPOSAL GROUPS HELD FOR SALE, TOTAL ASSETS, Secured Debt, 
Borrowings / Long-term Debt - Gross,  Net Long-term Debt (Net of Current Maturities), NON-CURRENT 
LIABILITIES, Trade Payables, Accounts Payable - Other, Deferred Income, CURRENT LIABILITIES, 
TOTAL LIABILITIES, Cumulative Translation Adjustment, TOTAL EQUITY and TOTAL LIABILITIES & 
EQUITY. 
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amount of balance sheet standard adjustments accounts for 17.4 % relative to reported Total 
Assets whereas that of non-standard adjustments covers 3.6 %. 
 
Regarding income statement in Appendix 5
23
, the items that are adjusted the most are Cost of 
Goods / Products / Services Sold (2.6 %) and Depreciation (Including Impairment Charges) 
(2.0 %). Both of the items face mainly non-standard adjustments. The adjustments of 
Operating Expenses account for 1.5 % relative to reported Total Assets and the standard 
adjustments are mostly due to operating leases (2). Other adjusted income statement items are 
Other Operating Income (0.8 %), Depreciation - Capitalized Operating Leases (0.8 %), 
Amortisation of Intangibles (Including Impairment Charges) (0.9 %), Equity-accounted 
Income (After Tax) (0.7 %) and Unusual & Non-recurring Items - Adjusted After Tax (0.9 
%). Interestingly, a greater part of income statement adjustments are non-standard (7.4 %) 
compared to standard adjustments (4.9 %). 
 
As far as cash flow statement in Appendix 6
24
 is concerned, items facing a significant amount 
of adjustments are Income Statement Activity (0.7 %), Depreciation & Amortisation (0.8 %), 
Cash Payments to Acquire PP&E and Intangibles (0.8 %), Proceeds from Long-term 
Borrowings (0.8 %) and Repayments of Borrowings (0.8 %). Apart from Income Statement 
Activity, the adjustments are due to operating leases (2). Altogether, a greater part of the 
adjustments consists of standard adjustments (4.1 % relative to 1.9 %). However, the items 
facing only non-standard adjustments are Other Investing Cash Flows (0.4 %), Interest Paid 
(0.5 %), Treasury Stock Issued / Repurchased (0.2 %) and Payment of Dividends (0.3 %). 
 
It can be seen from the 2007 adjustment data that the same items, namely Plant, Property & 
Equipment, Capitalized Leases and Debt, face a large amount of adjustments, as was seen 
from the main data. Moreover, it seems that the two important adjustment types underlying 
                                                 
23
 The following income statement items are not a part of the table as the amount of adjustments equals 0: Net 
Sales, Gross Profit, OPERATING PROFIT, EBIT, PRE-TAX INCOME, Minority Interest Expense (After Tax), 
Net Profit After Tax Before Unusual Items, INCOME (LOSS) FROM DISCONTINUED OPERATIONS, NET 
INCOME and NET INCOME AFTER ADJUSTED FOR UNUSUAL & NON-RECURRING ITEMS. 
24
 The following cash flow statement items are not a part of the table as the amount of adjustments equals 0: 
Minority Interest, Undistributed Equity Earnings, Discontinued Operations, Funds from Operations, CASH 
FLOW FROM OPERATIONS, CASH FLOW FROM OPERATIONS After Unusual & Non-recurring 
Adjustments, Proceeds from Disposal of PP&E and Intangibles, Business Acquisitions, Proceeds from Business 
Divestitures, INVESTING ACTIVITIES OF DISCONTINUED OPERATIONS, NET CASH FROM 
INVESTING ACTIVITIES, Long-term Debt Proceeds / Repayment - Net, Net Short-term Debt Changes, 
Preferred Stock Issued / Repurchased, Stock Options / Warrants - Net - Including Rights, Cash Dividends - 
Minority, FINANCING ACTIVITIES FROM DISCONTINUED OPERATIONS, NET CASH FROM 
FINANCING ACTIVITIES, Exchange Rate Impact on Cash and Cash Equivalents and NET INCREASE 
(DECREASE) IN CASH & EQUIVALENT. 
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the adjustments of these items are operating leases (2) and pensions (1). The next section 
concentrates more specifically on different adjustment types. 
 
5.2.2 The Most Common Standard Adjustment Types 
 
The 2007 data with specific adjustments allows a closer examination of the standard 
adjustment types that Credit Rating Agency X performs. Regarding firstly balance sheet 
standard adjustments in Appendix 4, the two most common adjustment types are operating 
leases (2) and pensions (1). The adjustments relating to operating leases account for 86.2 % of 
the total amount of balance sheet standard adjustments. Pension related adjustments, on the 
other hand, represent 11.3 % of the total balance sheet standard adjustments.  
 
When considering operating leases, the balance sheet items Gross Property, Plant and 
Equipment and Capitalized Leases are adjusted with a positive record. Additionally, the 
current portion of long-term debt is shown separately by recording a negative adjustment in 
Less: Current Maturities and a corresponding positive adjustment in Current Portion of 
Borrowings / Long-term Debt. The adjustments relating to pensions are directed at Other 
Assets, Bonds / Senior Debt, Other Long-term Liabilities, Deferred Tax and Retained 
Earnings. Two of the most important adjusted balance sheet items relating to pension 
adjustments are Other Long-term Liabilities, facing a negative record, and Bonds / Senior 
Debt that is adjusted with a positive record, as indicated by the rating methodology. 
Furthermore, the equity credit under an unfunded pension system is recorded in Retained 
Earnings. 
 
The income statement adjustments (Appendix 5) are most commonly due to operating leases 
(2), unusual and non-recurring items (12) and pensions (1). Operating leases account for 48.0 
% of the total income statement standard adjustments whereas unusual and non-recurring 
items cover 26.7 % and pensions 21.3 % of the total income statement standard adjustments. 
Regarding income statement items adjusted due to operating leases, the items Cost of Goods / 
Products / Services Sold, Operating Expenses and Selling, General and Administrative 
Expenses are reduced by reclassifying the rent expense to Interest Expense and to 
Depreciation - Capitalized Operating Leases, which are increased correspondingly. When 
considering adjustments due to unusual and non-recurring items, several income statement 
items are concerned. Most commonly, amounts recorded in Other Operating Income, Other 
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Non-operating Income and Other Non-operating Expenses are removed to Unusual & Non-
recurring Items - Adjusted After Tax. 
 
The items adjusted due to pensions are Cost of Goods / Products / Services Sold, Operating 
Expenses, Selling, General and Administrative Expenses, Other Non-recurring Expenses / 
Gains, Interest Expense, Taxes and Unusual & Non-recurring Items - Adjusted After Tax. As 
illustrated in Chapter 3, the service cost is considered as an operating cost of the pension plan. 
The interest cost on defined benefit obligation is recognized in Other Non-recurring Expenses 
/ Gains. Interest expense to pension-related debt is reclassified from Other Non-recurring 
Expenses / Gains to Interest Expense. Additionally, actual losses or gains on pension assets 
are recorded in Other Non-recurring Expenses / Gains. 
 
Finally, two of the most common adjustment types when considering cash flow statement are 
operating leases (2) and align FFO (11), as seen in Appendix 6. The former accounts for 75.8 
% of the total amount of cash flow statement standard adjustments whereas the latter 
represents a portion of 18.5 % of the total adjustments. Regarding operating lease 
adjustments, a portion of the rent payments is recorded from an operating cash outflow (a 
positive record to Depreciation & Amortisation) to a financing cash outflow (a negative 
record to Repayments of Borrowings). Capital expenditures are increased by recording a 
negative adjustment in Cash Payments to Acquire PP&E and Intangibles and a corresponding 
increase in Proceeds from Long-term Borrowings. The cash flow statement items adjusted for 
the measurement of FFO, on the other hand, are Income Statement Activity and Changes in 
Other Operating Assets & Liabilities – Short-term. 
 
5.2.3 Explaining the Amount of Financial Statement Adjustments 
 
This section will now demonstrate which variables are used to measure the amount of 
financial statement adjustments and which variables are included in the regression models to 
explain the amount of adjustments as well as how the variables have been determined. The 
objective of the first part of Chapter 6 will be to show whether the reporting standards and 
various company-specific factors are associated with the amount of adjustments. The effect of 
various variables on the amount of adjustments is examined by using the linear regression 
method. The data used in estimating the models is reported data from 2004-2007. Only rated 
companies are included in the analyses. 
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Dependent Variables 
 
Regressions are run using the amount of adjustment variables one at a time as the dependent 
variable. As five different variables describing the amount of adjustments are constructed, 
five different regression models will be estimated. The dependent variables used are the 
following: 
 
- SumADJ%TA: The relative amount of all financial statement adjustments, calculated as 
summing up the absolute values of the difference [ADJ – REP] of all financial 
statement items and deflating the sum with reported Total Assets. 
 
- CountADJ%TA: The relative number of adjusted financial statement items, calculated 
as the number of the financial statement items that are adjusted, deflated with the 
number of financial statement items that have a reported figure. 
 
- DiffOpPROF%TA: The relative amount of adjustments in Operating Profit, calculated 
as the absolute value of the difference between adjusted and reported Operating Profit 
deflated with reported Total Assets. 
 
- DiffIntEXP%TA: The relative amount of adjustments in Interest Expense, calculated as 
the absolute value of the difference between adjusted and reported Interest Expense 
deflated with reported Total Assets. 
 
- DiffTotDEBT%TA: The relative amount of adjustments in Total Debt, calculated as the 
absolute value of the difference between adjusted and reported Total Debt deflated with 
reported Total Assets. 
 
Independent Variables 
 
US GAAP are viewed as benchmark standards in this thesis, therefore the GAAP dummies 
included in the analyses are IFRS and LOCALGAAP. Various academic research papers have 
demonstrated the influence of the chosen reporting standards on the quality of financial 
statement information (for instance Barth et al., 2008; Soderstrom & Sun, 2007). Regarding 
company-specific factors, the selected characteristics include the size of a company, its 
profitability and capital intensity, growth and demand-related matters, business acquisitions 
and investments, capital need and financing, debt payback and interest coverage, liquidity as 
well as various operative risk related factors. Academic literature has identified several firm-
specific characteristics having an impact on the quality of financial statement information. To 
begin with, large companies may engage more in earnings management (Graham et al., 2005). 
Profitability may affect the quality of information for instance when the bonuses of managers 
depend on reported earnings, leading them to manage earnings (Scott 2009, 406). As far as 
capital structure and leverage are concerned, shareholders may demand more information than 
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banks and increase incentives to improve the quality of information (Burgstahler et al., 2007; 
Sun, 2005). Increased risk may cause managers to smooth earnings in order to reduce the 
volatility, for instance in order to avoid the violation of contract clauses (Scott 2009, 405). 
Capital intensity, on the other hand, is an important feature characterizing companies present 
in the telecommunications industry. Such companies generally have high fixed costs, relating 
for instance to Research & Development, which in turn increases the operative risk of the 
companies. 
 
When determining possible firm-specific variables to describe the mentioned characteristics, 
credit rating literature and key ratios of Moody‟s, introduced in section 3.2 Underlying 
Factors Affecting Credit Ratings, were both considered carefully. Originally 25 firm-specific 
variables were chosen for the tests.
25
 The amount of variables was further reduced to 13 
during the first regression analyses when determining the variables that best explained the 
amount of adjustments and also by eliminating several alternative variables having a similar 
content. During the first regression analyses, a severe multicollinearity problem was 
encountered because of the natural logarithm of Total Assets which is an important variable 
characterizing the size of the company. The condition index was constantly extremely high, 
although no high correlations were found. It may be that a company‟s size affects all the 
aspects of the firm to the extent that it increases considerably the condition index. After 
eliminating the variable, condition index was reduced well below 20 in all the regression 
models. Also, a natural logarithm of Revenues was tried as the size variable but the behaviour 
of the condition index was similar to that with the natural logarithm of Total Assets. 
However, the size of a company could be taken into account in the analyses by constructing 
four different dummy variables. Firstly, companies were divided into five different groups 
based on Total Assets. The first group was taken as a benchmark group, and the four other 
groups were assigned a number from 1 (the smallest) to 4 (the largest). By using these dummy 
variables the multicollinearity problem could be avoided. 
 
                                                 
25
 Ln(Total Assets), ROA, Profit Margin, Asset Turnover, Change in Sales, Goodwill to Total Assets, 
Depreciation to Total Assets, Capital Expenditures to Total Assets, Common Shares Issued to Total Assets, 
Long-term Debt Issued to Total Assets, Dividends to Total Assets, Debt to EBITDA, Debt to Total Assets, 
Short-term Debt to Long-term Debt, Retained Cash Flow to Debt, Free Cash Flow to Debt, Debt to Book 
Capitalization, EBIT to Interest Expense, EBITDA to Interest Expense, Funds from Operations plus Interest 
Expense to Interest Expense, Interest Expense to EBIT, Quick Ratio, Coefficient of Variation of Net Income, 
Operating Leverage and a dummy for negative Operating Profit. 
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Five other firm-specific variables
26
 were further eliminated from the final models using the t-
statistic as a criterion. When the variables were all included in the model at the same time, 
they had a t-statistic below 1. This means that they did not add to the explanatory power of 
the model but rather reduced it. However, the effect of these variables on the amount of 
adjustments will be investigated during sensitivity tests in section 6.3.1 Removed Variables 
from the Models Explaining the Amount of Adjustments. The company-specific variables used 
in the final models are the following: 
 
- AsTRNV: Asset Turnover, calculated as Revenues divided with Total Assets. 
 
- ChgREV: Change in Revenues, calculated as the percentage change in Revenues 
relative to the previous year. 
 
- DEBT/BCap: Debt to Book Capitalization. 
 
- QckRATIO: Quick Ratio, calculated as Cash and Equivalents plus Net Trade 
Receivables divided with Current Liabilities. 
 
- CVNI: Coefficient of Variation of Net Income, calculated as the standard deviation of 
Net Income divided with the mean of Net Income over 4 years. 
 
- ProfMRG: Profit Margin, calculated as Net Income divided with Revenues. 
 
- GROUP: 1 for the main company, otherwise 0. The main company is determined on the 
basis of Revenues. 
 
- NegOpPROF: Negative Operating Profit; 1 if Operating Profit < 0, otherwise 0. 
 
- PUBLIC: 1 for publicly listed company, otherwise 0. 
 
- SIZE1: 1 for the 2nd quintile of companies, otherwise 0. The five groups are formed 
based on Total Assets, the smallest group being the benchmark.  
 
- SIZE2: 1 for the 3rd quintile of companies, otherwise 0. 
 
- SIZE3: 1 for the 4th quintile of companies, otherwise 0. 
 
- SIZE4: 1 for the 5th quintile of companies, otherwise 0. 
 
Regarding control variables, country dummies were determined firstly by constructing a 
dummy variable for each of the 53 countries, then using the country dummies as independent 
variables and the adjustment variables as dependent variables in a linear regression, and 
finally by selecting those countries that were significant during the regressions. The frequency 
was also investigated so that all the countries included in the analyses contain at least 7 firm-
                                                 
26
 Common Shares Issued to Total Assets, Long-term Debt Issued to Total Assets, Dividends to Total Assets, 
Short-term Debt to Long-term Debt and Interest Expense to EBIT. 
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year observations in the data. The selected dummies include the following 11 countries: 
Argentina, Brazil, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Philippines, 
Thailand and United Kingdom. Additionally, regression models include dummy variables to 
control differences in years
27
. 
 
Table 2 represents the descriptive statistics relating to both dependent and independent 
variables used in the final regression models explaining adjustments. Table 3, on the other 
hand, illustrates the correlation matrix including the continuous company-specific variables 
used to explain adjustments in the final regression models. 
 
5.2.4 Credit Rating Models 
 
The objective of the second part of empirical analyses is to investigate the association 
between financial statement adjustments and credit ratings. For this purpose, a credit rating 
model will be constructed by combining some of the key ratios of Moody‟s as well as those of 
Kaplan and Urwitz (1979) to complement the model. The rating model is estimated with a 
linear regression method using data from 2004-2007. The main focus will be on six credit 
rating models, five of them containing a different adjustment variable and one of them 
containing a combination of two adjustment variables. These models are estimated using 
reported data. Also, an additional test will be conducted in which the rating model is 
estimated without any adjustment variables using 1) reported and 2) adjusted data. The 
quality differences between these two sets of data will be investigated by analyzing the 
resulting explanatory power of the two models. 
 
The dependent variable of the credit rating models is the real credit rating assigned by Credit 
Rating Agency X. The primary focus is on a scale having categories from 1 to 19, including a 
separate rating category for all the ratings describing the relative standing within the main 
category. Additionally, a cruder scale from 1 to 8 will be used during the sensitivity tests 
including only the main rating categories, as in the study of Kaplan and Urwitz (1979). 
 
                                                 
27
 Year 2004 is considered as the benchmark year. 
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Characteristic Variable N Mean Median STD
Dependent Variables
Amount of Adjustments SumADJ%TA 457 1.106 0.920 1.023
Amount of Adjustments CountADJ%TA 457 0.460 0.468 0.087
Amount of Adjustments DiffOpPROF%TA 457 0.012 0.005 0.043
Amount of Adjustments DiffIntEXP%TA 457 0.008 0.005 0.009
Amount of Adjustments DiffTotDEBT%TA 457 0.106 0.086 0.092
Independent Variables
Capital Intensity AsTRNV 457 0.570 0.523 0.257
Growth ChgREV 436 0.111 0.053 0.208
Leverage DEBT/BCap 457 0.621 0.480 0.773
Liquidity QckRATIO 457 0.778 0.688 0.488
Operative Risk CVNI 487 4.345 0.308 40.182
Profitability ProfMRG 457 0.082 0.096 0.170
Value = 1
Accounting Standard IFRS 515 145 (28.2 %)
Accounting Standard LOCALGAAP 515 121 (23.5 %)
Corporate Structure GROUP 515 428 (83.1 %)
Country ARGENTINA 515 7 (1.4 %)
Country BRAZIL 515 15 (2.9 %)
Country INDONESIA 515 16 (3.1 %)
Country JAPAN 515 16 (3.1 %)
Country KOREA 515 11 (2.1 %)
Country LUXEMBOURG 515 11 (2.1 %)
Country MEXICO 515 17 (3.3 %)
Country PHILIPPINES 515 8 (1.6 %)
Country HONGKONG 515 7  (1.4 %)
Country THAILAND 515 7 (1.4 %)
Country UNITEDKINGDOM 515 16 (3.1 %)
Operative Risk NegOpPROF 456 41 (9.0 %)
Public/Private PUBLIC 515 299 (58.1 %)
Size SIZE1 515 87 (16.9 %)
Size SIZE2 515 91 (17.7 %)
Size SIZE3 515 97 (18.8 %)
Size SIZE4 515 113 (21.9 %)
TABLE 2
Descriptive Statistics Relating to Regression Models Explaining the Amount of Adjustments
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Variable ProfMRG AsTRNV ChgREV CVNI DEBT/BCap QckRATIO
ProfMRG 0.095* 0.079 0.050 -0.509** -0.192**
0.042 0.101 0.295 0.000 0.000
AsTRNV -0.032 0.061 0.091 -0.080 0.028
0.495 0.204 0.054 0.088 0.551
ChgREV 0.037 0.035 0.148** -0.101* 0.109*
0.447 0.461 0.002 0.034 0.023
CVNI -0.034 -0.061 -0.013 0.016 -0.031
0.467 0.196 0.783 0.730 0.518
DEBT/BCap -0.141** 0.299** -0.068 0.013 0.068
0.003 0.000 0.155 0.782 0.144
QckRATIO -0.032 -0.005 0.083 0.003 0.020
0.489 0.910 0.083 0.944 0.668
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level.
TABLE 3
Correlations Relating to the Continuous Firm-specific Variables Explaining the Amount of Adjustments
(upper-right diagonal Spearman; lower-left diagonal Pearson)
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level.
 
 
Test Variables 
 
The association between financial statement adjustments and credit ratings is investigated by 
including the adjustment variables introduced in section 5.2.3 Explaining the Amount of 
Financial Statement Adjustments in the credit rating model, one at a time. Additionally, the 
rating model will include interaction terms for reporting standards and adjustments to take 
into account the impact of IFRS and local GAAP adjustments on rating relative to US GAAP. 
When the interaction terms are included in the model, the adjustment variables measure the 
effect of US adjustments on rating. The interaction terms, on the other hand, measure the 
effect of IFRS and local GAAP adjustments on rating. Furthermore, GAAP dummies IFRS 
and LOCALGAAP are of interest. The GAAP dummies will indicate the impact of the 
reporting standards on credit rating relative to US GAAP before any adjustments are made. 
The interaction terms used in the rating models are defined as: 
 
- IFRS*SumADJ%TA: IFRS dummy multiplied with the relative amount of all financial 
statement adjustments. 
   
- LOCALGAAP*SumADJ%TA: LOCALGAAP dummy multiplied with the relative 
amount of all financial statement adjustments. 
 
- IFRS*CountADJ%TA: IFRS dummy multiplied with the relative number of adjusted 
financial statement items. 
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- LOCALGAAP*CountADJ%TA: LOCALGAAP dummy multiplied with the relative 
number of adjusted financial statement items. 
 
- IFRS*DiffOpPROF%TA: IFRS dummy multiplied with the relative amount of 
adjustments in Operating Profit. 
 
- LOCALGAAP*DiffOpPROF%TA: LOCALGAAP dummy multiplied with the relative 
amount of adjustments in Operating Profit. 
 
- IFRS*DiffIntEXP%TA: IFRS dummy multiplied with the relative amount of 
adjustments in Interest Expense. 
 
- LOCALGAAP*DiffIntEXP%TA: LOCALGAAP multiplied with the relative amount 
of adjustments in Interest Expense. 
 
- IFRS*DiffTotDEBT%TA: IFRS dummy multiplied with the relative amount of 
adjustments in Total Debt. 
 
- LOCALGAAP*DiffTotDEBT%TA: LOCALGAAP dummy multiplied with the 
relative amount of adjustments in Total Debt. 
 
Control Variables 
 
Originally, five firm-specific continuous control variables were selected to the rating model. 
The selected key ratios of Moody‟s included EBITA to Average Assets, EBITDA to Interest 
Expense and Debt to Book Capitalization, whereas the natural logarithm of Total Assets and 
Coefficient of Variation of Net Income were selected from the Kaplan-Urwitz (1979) models. 
At the very beginning of the analyses, it became clear that the natural logarithm of Total 
Asset introduced a similar multicollinearity problem to the model as described previously 
with the model explaining the amount of adjustments. The natural logarithm of Total Assets 
was therefore replaced with the size dummies, as in the previous part. Furthermore, the 
variable EBITDA to Interest Expense was replaced by Interest Expense to EBIT, being more 
relevant in the model. The dummy variable for negative Operating Profit was further added to 
the model since it proved to be important in explaining the amount of adjustments. The 
control variables describing company characteristics in the final rating model are thus: 
 
- EBITA/AvAs.: EBITA to Average Assets. 
 
- IntEXP/EBIT: Interest Expense to EBIT. 
 
- Debt/BCap 
 
- CVNI 
 
- NegOpProf 
 
- GROUP 
 
- PUBLIC 
 
- SIZE1, SIZE2, SIZE3 and SIZE4 
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Other control variables include dummy variables for years 2005-2007 and 14 country 
dummies. Country dummies include the 11 countries being part of model explaining the 
amount of adjustments. Moreover, dummies for Chile, Netherlands and Russia are added to 
the rating model, being relevant when explaining ratings. 
 
Table 4 represents the descriptive statistics relating to the variables included in the regression 
models. As the variables describing the amount of adjustments are the same as in Table 2, 
they are not a part of Table 4. Panel A includes the descriptive statistics relating to the 
interaction terms for reporting standards and adjustments. Panel B presents descriptive 
statistics of the company-specific variables calculated with reported data while Panel C 
illustrates those calculated with adjusted data. Although the size variable Total Assets is not a 
part of the rating models, it is included in the table in order to demonstrate the absolute size of 
companies. Some of the variables calculated with reported data are already included in Table 
2 but they are shown in Table 4 to enable their comparison with variables calculated with 
adjusted data. Panel D shows the number of total observations as well as the number of 
observations getting a value of 1 for the three country dummies not being part of Table 2. 
Descriptive statistics relating to other dummy control variables used in the rating models are 
found in Table 2. Regarding Tables 5 and 6, they illustrate the correlation matrices for the 
continuous test and control variables used in the final rating models. Table 5 includes the 
adjustment variables together with firm-specific continuous control variables calculated with 
reported data. Table 6, on the other hand, presents correlations relating to firm-specific 
continuous control variables calculated with adjusted data. 
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PANEL A: Interaction Terms for GAAPs and Adjustments
Characteristic Variable N Mean Median STD
Interaction Term IFRS*SumADJ%TA 457 0.326 0.000 0.808
Interaction Term IFRS*CountADJ%TA 457 0.136 0.000 0.222
Interaction Term IFRS*DiffOpPROF%TA 457 0.003 0.000 0.015
Interaction Term IFRS*DiffIntEXP%TA 457 0.002 0.000 0.005
Interaction Term IFRS*DiffTotDEBT%TA 457 0.030 0.000 0.076
Interaction Term LOCALGAAP*SumADJ%TA 457 0.227 0.000 0.510
Interaction Term LOCALGAAP*CountADJ%TA 457 0.108 0.000 0.197
Interaction Term LOCALGAAP*DiffOpPROF%TA 457 0.002 0.000 0.005
Interaction Term LOCALGAAP*DiffIntEXP%TA 457 0.002 0.000 0.006
Interaction Term LOCALGAAP*DiffTotDEBT%TA 457 0.023 0.000 0.054
PANEL B: Company-specific Control Variables Calculated with Reported Data
Characteristic Variable N Mean Median STD
Interest Coverage IntEXP/EBIT 457 0.043 0.240 6.110
Leverage DEBT/BCap 457 0.621 0.480 0.773
Operative Risk CVNI 487 4.345 0.308 40.182
Profitability EBITA/AvAs 457 0.120 0.111 0.117
Size Total Assets 457 19,765,183 5,818,486 42,860,000
Value = 1
Operative Risk NegOpPROF 456 41 (9.0 %)
Size SIZE1 515 87 (16.9 %)
Size SIZE2 515 91 (17.7 %)
Size SIZE3 515 97 (18.8 %)
Size SIZE4 515 113 (21.9 %)
PANEL C: Company-specific Control Variables Calculated with Adjusted Data
Characteristic Variable N Mean Median STD
Interest Coverage IntEXP/EBIT 457 0.711 0.297 6.407
Leverage DEBT/BCap 457 0.632 0.557 0.358
Operative Risk CVNI 487 0.082 0.269 2.582
Profitability EBITA/AvAs 457 0.113 0.104 0.081
Size Total Assets 457 21,014,602 6,262,874 45,150,000
Value = 1
Operative Risk NegOpPROF 456 33 (7.2 %)
Size SIZE1 515 87 (16.9 %)
Size SIZE2 515 89 (17.3 %)
Size SIZE3 515 98 (19.0 %)
Size SIZE4 515 114 (22.1 %)
PANEL D: Country-related Control Variables
Characteristic Variable N Value = 1
Country CHILE 515 8
Country NETHERLANDS 515 8
Country RUSSIA 515 27
TABLE 4
Descriptive Statistics Relating to Variables Included in the Rating Models
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Variable EBITA/AvAs IntEXP/EBIT DEBT/BCap CVNI
EBITA/AvAs -0.373 -0.302 0.209
0.000 0.000 0.000
IntEXP/EBIT -0.076 0.457 0.085
0.106 0.000 0.070
DEBT/BCap -0.271** 0.068 -0.100
0.000 0.146 0.034
CVNI 0.121* -0.046 -0.013
0.010 0.330 0.782
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level.
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level.
Correlations Relating to Variables Included in the Rating Models Calculated with Adjusted Data
(upper-right diagonal Spearman; lower-left diagonal Pearson)
TABLE 6
 
 
 
6 TESTS AND RESULTS 
 
Chapter 6 begins with addressing the first question introduced at the beginning of the thesis of 
which reporting standards and company-specific factors are associated with financial 
statement adjustments. The second part of the chapter seeks to find an answer to the second 
question posed in Chapter 1. The focus is then on the credit rating models and the aim is to 
investigate the association between adjustments and credit ratings. The last section of the 
chapter consists of sensitivity tests. 
  
6.1 Association between Reporting Standards, Company-specific Factors and 
Financial Statement Adjustments 
 
The descriptive tests in Chapter 5 identified those financial statement items that are most 
commonly adjusted. The attention is now directed towards the reasons that explain the quality 
differences, i.e. the amount of adjustments, between reported and adjusted data. Several 
adjustment variables were constructed in Chapter 5, and they are now used one at a time as a 
dependent variable. The following models are estimated: 
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1. Model explaining SumADJ%TA; 
 
2. Model explaining DiffOpPROF%TA; 
 
3. Model explaining DiffIntEXP%TA; and 
 
4. Model explaining DiffTotDEBT%TA. 
 
 
The regression results for models 1-4 are illustrated in Table 7. The explanatory power, the 
adjusted R
2
, of each of the regression model is 0.399, 0.351, 0.327 and 0.326, respectively. 
The condition index of Model 2 equals 19.327, whereas that of the other models is 19.074. 
 
First, the model explaining the relative amount of all financial statement adjustments is taken 
under consideration (Model 1). The variables IFRS and LOCALGAAP for reporting 
standards have a positive effect on the amount of adjustments but are not statistically 
significant. Regarding firm-specific variables, AsTRNV, NegOpPROF, DEBT/BCap and 
QckRATIO are significant and all have a positive effect on the amount of adjustments. 
Country dummies ARGENTINA, INDONESIA, JAPAN and THAILAND are significant 
with a negative effect whereas KOREA, LUXEMBOURG and UNITEDKINGDOM are 
significant and have a positive effect on the amount of adjustments. 
 
The second model explains the relative amount of adjustments in Operating Profit (Model 2). 
The GAAP dummies IFRS and LOCALGAAP are positive but not statistically significant. 
However, the variables ProfMRG, DEBT/BCap and GROUP are significant with a negative 
effect while AsTRNV and NegOpPROF are significant with a positive effect on the amount 
of adjustments. ARGENTINA and JAPAN are significant with a negative impact whereas 
UNITEDKINGDOM is significant with a positive impact. 
 
Thirdly, GAAP dummies are not significant in the regression model explaining the relative 
amount of adjustments in Interest Expense (Model 3). The company-specific variables 
AsTRNV, NegOpPROF and DEBT/BCap are statistically significant with a positive effect 
whereas PUBLIC is significant with a negative effect on the amount of adjustments. 
Regarding control variables, BRAZIL, KOREA and UNITEDKINGDOM have a positive 
coefficient while that of THAILAND is negative. 
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Fourth, when turning to the model explaining the relative amount of adjustments in Total 
Debt (Model 4), dummies for IFRS and LOCALGAAP are not statistically significant. 
AsTRNV and DEBT/BCap are significant with a positive effect while PUBLIC and CVNI are 
significant with a negative effect. Furthermore, ARGENTINA, INDONESIA and 
THAILAND have a negative impact on the amount of adjustments whereas that of BRAZIL, 
LUXEMBOURG and UNITEDKINGDOM is positive. 
 
Chapter 5 also introduced a fifth adjustment variable, CountADJ%TA, measuring the relative 
number of adjustments. Appendix 7 presents the regression results from the model explaining 
this variable. The reason that the results are not included in Table 6 with the other models is 
that when turning to the rating models, the variable causes significant multicollinearity 
problems. However, now when explaining adjustments the condition index stays at 19.074 
whereas the adjusted R
2
 is 0.357. The GAAP variable IFRS is statistically significant and its 
effect on the amount of adjustments is positive. Of the company-specific variables, SIZE1, 
SIZE3 and GROUP have a significant and negative effect on the amount of adjustments. 
Moreover, ARGENTINA and KOREA are significant with a negative impact and 
UNITEDKINGDOM is significant with a positive impact on adjustments. 
 
Now, looking at the results of these five regression models together, evidence shows that 
different reporting standards do not explain the differences in financial statement adjustments 
for different companies. As these variables are interpreted in relation to US GAAP, a change 
from US GAAP to IFRS or to a local GAAP does not affect the amount of adjustments. In 
other words, US GAAP, IFRS and local GAAPs have all a similar effect on adjustments. 
 
As the GAAPs are not the underlying reason for the amount of adjustments, one must look for 
the answer in the business fundamentals and company-specific factors. The evidence shows 
that capital intensity, operative risk and leverage have a significant impact on the amount of 
adjustments. Moreover, the mentioned characteristics are positively associated with 
adjustments.
28
 Thus, the greater the capital intensity, the riskier or the more levered the 
company, the larger the amount of adjustments made during a rating process. Additionally, it 
seems that public companies face fewer adjustments relative to private companies and that the 
main companies of a corporate group also face fewer adjustments relative to the other 
companies. 
                                                 
28
 Except for DEBT/BCap in Model 2 explaining the relative amount of adjustments in Operating Profit, the 
variable has a negative coefficient. However, in Models 1, 3 and 4 the coefficient is positive. 
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These findings are consistent with prior academic evidence. A higher risk may lead to 
increased earnings management (Scott 2009, 405) lowering the quality of financial statement 
information whereas a higher level of debt financing decreases the incentives to improve the 
quality of information (Sun, 2005). The results of this research suggest that, in both of these 
cases, adjustments increase. Moreover, results are consistent with Burgstahler et al. (2007) 
suggesting that the earnings of public firms are of higher quality relative to private ones. The 
results of this thesis indicate that adjustments are smaller for public companies. Thus, when 
the results are compared to prior academic evidence, it seems that circumstances relating to 
lower information quality are associated with greater amount of financial statement 
adjustments. Capital intensity, on the other hand, is an important characteristic relating to 
telecommunication companies (Moody‟s, 2007). It might be that it is an important industry-
related determinant for adjustments and explains why telecommunication companies face 
more adjustments relative to companies active in less capital intensive industries. However, 
further evidence from cross-industry comparisons is needed in order to confirm whether that 
is true. 
 
When considering country-related variables in the models altogether, the companies in 
Argentina and Thailand face fewer adjustments in average whereas the companies in United 
Kingdom experience more adjustments on average relative to companies in countries not 
having a country dummy included in the models. Furthermore, there is some evidence that 
companies in Brazil and Luxembourg face more adjustments on average and companies in 
Indonesia and Japan fewer adjustments on average than companies in countries not being part 
of the model country dummies. 
 
What then seems to be the ultimate underlying reason for adjustments? As was seen in section 
5.2.2 The Most Common Standard Adjustment Types when analyzing the adjustment data 
from 2007, two of the most common standard adjustment types are operating leases and 
pensions. Leasing is essentially an alternative to acquire an asset without buying it. The 
company makes a choice of how it finances its investments; either with debt or by resorting to 
leasing. Regarding defined benefit pensions, companies follow either a pre-funded or 
unfunded scheme. The two schemes differ considerably in how the pension obligation is 
financed. In the case of the latter system, the financial statements are adjusted, among other, 
by constructing a pre-funding of pension obligations. It is essentially these two standard 
adjustment types that have a major effect on leverage as well as on operating performance 
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measures. It all crystallizes in the question of how pensions and investments are financed. 
Thus, the financing and capital structure as well as contractual decisions do matter and 
influence the amount of adjustments. 
 
6.2 Association between Financial Statement Adjustments and Credit Ratings 
 
The second section of the empirical analyses focuses on investigating whether financial 
statement adjustments are associated with credit ratings. The effect of adjustments on credit 
ratings is investigated firstly by adding the different variables describing the amount of 
adjustments in the rating model. Secondly, the rating models are estimated in an additional 
test without the adjustment variables and the adjusted R
2
s are compared between reported and 
adjusted data. 
 
6.2.1 Adjustment Variables Included in the Credit Rating Model 
 
The research hypothesis H1 presented in Chapter 4 assumes that the amount of financial 
statement adjustments made by a credit rating agency is associated with credit ratings. In 
order to test the hypothesis, the adjustment variables introduced in section 5.2.3 Explaining 
the Amount of Financial Statement Adjustments are included one at a time in a benchmark 
rating model including no adjustment variables. The rating models are estimated using 
reported data from the time period 2004-2007. The rationale is that reported data is the 
starting point for the rating process and that the aim is to measure the quality of reported data. 
The following models are estimated: 
 
0. Benchmark model not including any adjustment variables; 
 
1. Model including the variable SumADJ%TA; 
 
2. Model including the variable DiffOpPROF%TA; 
 
3. Model including the variable DiffIntEXP%TA; 
 
4. Model including the variable DiffTotDEBT%TA; 
 
5. Model including the variables DiffOpPROF%TA and DiffTotDEBT%TA. 
 
The regression results of Models 0-5 are illustrated in Table 8, respectively. The explanatory 
power of the models, measured with the adjusted R
2
s, is 0.523, 0.542, 0.535, 0.536, 0.542 and 
0.539, respectively. The condition indices, on the other hand, are 14.534, 16.850, 14.972, 
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16.219, 17.045 and 15.585, respectively. Using both GAAP dummies and interaction terms 
for GAAPs and adjustments leads to a slight increase in the multicollinearity of the regression 
models, which can bee seen in increased VIF values. This is why Models 0-5 are also 
estimated without GAAP dummies (see Appendix 8). The text will mention how the models 
estimated without GAAPs differ from those estimated with GAAPs. 
 
First, the benchmark model estimated without any adjustments variables (Model 0) has an 
explanatory power slightly lower than that of the other models (0.523). Of the test variables, 
the GAAP dummy for IFRS is statistically significant, its effect being positive on credit 
rating. LOCALGAAP, on the other hand, is positive but not significant. Regarding control 
variables, three of the size dummies, namely SIZE2, SIZE3 and SIZE4, are extremely 
significant having a positive coefficient while those of DEBT/BCap, CVNI, NegOpPROF and 
GROUP are negative. CHILE and JAPAN have a positive effect on rating whereas the impact 
of ARGENTINA, INDONESIA, LUXEMBOURG, NETHERLANDS and RUSSIA is 
negative. When the model is estimated without GAAP dummies, the adjusted R
2
 decreases 
slightly to 0.521 while the condition index equals 13.611. In addition to the mentioned 
variables, EBITA/AvAs is significant with a positive impact. On the other hand, CVNI and 
JAPAN are no longer significant. 
 
When considering Model 1, the variable SumADJ%TA is significant having a positive 
coefficient whereas the interaction term LOCALGAAP*SumADJ%TA is significant with a 
negative coefficient. Also, both of the GAAP dummies are significant with a positive effect 
on rating. Of the firms-specific control variables, SIZE2, SIZE3, and SIZE4 have a positive 
effect whereas DEBT/BCap, NegOpPROF and GROUP have a negative effect on rating. The 
control dummies CHILE and JAPAN have a positive coefficient while those of 
ARGENTINA, INDONESIA, LUXEMBOURG, NETHERLANDS and RUSSIA are 
negative. When the GAAP dummies are excluded from the model, the variable SumADJ%TA 
is no longer significant. As a consequence, the adjusted R
2
 and the condition index are 0.532 
and 15.906, respectively. 
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Moving to Model 2, DiffOpPROF%TA together with the GAAP interaction terms are 
included in the benchmark rating model. DiffOpPROF%TA is statistically significant together 
with IFRS, both having a positive effect on rating. The three size dummies SIZE2, SIZE3, 
and SIZE4 have a positive effect while that of DEBT/BCap, NegOpPROF and GROUP is 
negative, as with previous models. However, in this model also EBITA/AvAs is significant 
with a positive impact on rating. Regarding other controls, CHILE and JAPAN have a 
positive coefficient whereas ARGENTINA, INDONESIA, LUXEMBOURG, 
NETHERLANDS, PHILIPPINES and RUSSIA have a negative coefficient. When the model 
is estimated without GAAP dummies, the same variables are significant with the same sign of 
coefficient, except for country dummies CHILE, JAPAN and PHILIPPINES that are no 
longer significant. The resulting adjusted R
2
 and condition index equal 0.541 and 14.494, 
respectively. 
 
Model 3 contains two significant test variables. DiffIntEXP%TA and IFRS are significant 
with a positive coefficient. The size dummies SIZE2, SIZE3, and SIZE4 have a positive 
impact, contrary to DEBT/BCap, NegOpPROF and GROUP that have a negative impact on 
rating. As previously, the same country-related controls stand out; CHILE and JAPAN are 
significant and positive while ARGENTINA, INDONESIA, LUXEMBOURG, 
NETHERLANDS and RUSSIA are significant and negative. When Model 3 is estimated 
without GAAP dummies, the interaction term IFRS*DiffIntEXP%TA is statistically 
significant with a positive impact on rating. As far as country dummies are concerned, CHILE 
and JAPAN are not significant anymore. The model estimated without GAAP dummies 
generates an adjusted R
2
 of 0.549 and a condition index of 15.871. 
 
Next, in Model 4 four test variables are significant. DiffTotDEBT%TA, IFRS and 
LOCALGAAP have a positive coefficient whereas that of 
LOCALGAAP*DiffTotDEBT%TA is negative. Also in this model variables SIZE2, SIZE3 
and SIZE4 are significant and positive, and DEBT/BCap, NegOpPROF and GROUP are 
significant and negative. ARGENTINA, INDONESIA, LUXEMBOURG, NETHERLANDS 
and RUSSIA are all negative. Excluding the GAAP dummies results in DiffTotDEBT%TA 
being no longer significant. In addition to the country dummies mentioned above, CHILE 
becomes significant with a positive effect. The adjusted R
2
 is 0.533 and the condition index 
16.015 in the model estimated without GAAP dummies. 
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Finally, Model 5 includes two adjustment variables, namely DiffOpPROF%TA and 
DiffTotDEBT%TA. The model could not be estimated with interaction terms for GAAPs and 
adjustments due to multicollinearity problems. Therefore, the test variables consist of the two 
adjustment variables and GAAP dummies. DiffOpPROF%TA is significant together with 
IFRS, both having a positive impact on rating. Regarding firm-specific control variables, 
SIZE2, SIZE3, SIZE4 and EBITA/AvAs have a positive effect on rating while DEBT/BCap, 
NegOpPROF and GROUP have a negative effect. Moreover, the coefficients of CHILE and 
JAPAN are positive whereas those of ARGENTINA, INDONESIA, LUXEMBOURG, 
NETHERLANDS and RUSSIA are negative. 
 
Model 5 was also estimated by including three adjustment variables, DiffOpPROF%TA, 
DiffIntEXP%TA and DiffTotDEBT%TA, in the model (Appendix 9). Including 
DiffIntEXP%TA, having a t-statistic below 1 and a high correlation with DiffTotDEBT%TA, 
leads to a slightly lower adjusted R
2
 (0.538) and a bit higher condition index (16.126) 
compared to the model with two variables. However, the same variables are significant with 
the same sign of coefficient as with the model estimated with two adjustment variables. When 
the GAAP dummies are not part of the model, country dummies CHILE and JAPAN are no 
longer significant with both two and three adjustment variables in the model.
29
 
 
As mentioned earlier, when the variable CountADJ%TA is included in the benchmark model, 
a severe multicollinearity problem is encountered. Having the variable CountADJ%TA in the 
model together with the interaction terms and GAAP dummies (1) increases the condition 
index all the way to 61.874 and the VIF values of the interaction terms and GAAP dummies 
are around 50-70.
30
 The model is then estimated by including in the benchmark model several 
combinations of the test variables: 2) CountADJ%TA together with the interaction terms
31
, 3) 
CountADJ%TA together with GAAP dummies
32
, and 4) CountADJ%TA alone without 
GAAPs or interaction terms
33
. The multicollinearity problem stays in each of these 
regressions although the variable CountADJ%TA does not have a high correlation with the 
other variables. The signs of regression coefficients relating to test variables are in line with 
other models. However, the condition index indicates that the regression results cannot be 
                                                 
29
 With two adjustment variables the adjusted R
2
 equals 0.545 and condition index 15.165 (Appendix 8) while 
with three adjustment variables the statistics are 0.545 and 15.746 (Appendix 9), respectively. 
30
 Adjusted R
2
 is 0.548. 
31
 Adjusted R
2
 is 0.533 and condition index equals 34.873. 
32
 Adjusted R
2
 is 0.531 and condition index equals 33.099. 
33
 Adjusted R
2
 is 0.521 and condition index equals 31.220. 
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reliably analyzed when the variable CountADJ%TA is included in the model. Moreover, 
when the GAAP dummies are removed from the model (combinations (1) and (2)), the size of 
the coefficients of the remaining test variables decreases considerably. The regression models 
are shown in Appendix 10. 
 
Now, taken the results of these regression analyses together, when GAAPs are included in the 
models the test variables for the amount of adjustments and IFRS are significant and positive 
in all of the models 1-5.
34
 The interaction terms for the amount of adjustments and IFRS are 
never significant. On the contrary, the interaction terms for the amount of adjustments and 
local GAAPs are always negative and the variables are significant in Models 1 and 4. 
LOCALGAAP is significant with a positive effect in Models 1 and 4. However, the sign of 
the coefficient changes and is negative in Model 5, although the variable is not significant. 
When considering the two adjustment variables in the same model (Model 5), 
DiffOpPROF%TA is significant in explaining ratings with a positive impact. The size 
dummies SIZE2, SIZE3 and SIZE4 are significant and positive whereas DEBT/BCap and 
NegOpPROF are significant and negative in all models. Moreover, GROUP has a negative 
impact on rating in every regression model. Regarding country dummies, CHILE and 
JAPAN
35
 have a positive effect on rating whereas ARGENTINA, INDONESIA, 
LUXEMBOURG, NETHERLANDS and RUSSIA have a negative effect.  
 
When the GAAPs are not included in the models, the adjustment variables are always 
positive, and they are significant in Models 2 and 5. The interaction term for IFRS 
adjustments is significant once with a positive effect, in Model 3. The interaction term for 
local GAAP adjustments is always negative and it is significant in Models 1 and 4. As in the 
models with GAAPs, DiffOpPROF%TA is a significant variable in explaining ratings with a 
positive impact when two adjustment variables are included. Besides CHILE and JAPAN that 
no longer are significant without GAAPs, the same firm-specific and country-related variables 
are significant. 
 
Based on these regression analyses, it seems that the amount of US adjustments, measured 
with four different variables, have a significantly positive association with credit ratings. The 
larger the amount of adjustments made to US companies, the higher the rating. This finding is 
consistent regardless of the adjustment variable used in the rating model. Additionally, the 
                                                 
34
 IFRS is also significant in the Benchmark Model 0.  
35
 With the exception of Model 4, where JAPAN is not significant. 
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results indicate that, without any adjustments performed, credit ratings are higher for 
companies reporting under IFRS, relative to companies reporting under US GAAP. There is 
no strong evidence of the relative standing of local GAAP ratings before adjustments are 
performed relative to US ratings. However, the results suggest that local GAAP adjustments 
decrease credit ratings relative to US GAAP ratings. As Model 5 does not include interaction 
terms for adjustments and different GAAPs, the adjustment variable does not describe 
anymore US adjustments, but the adjustments in general for companies included in the 
analyses. The evidence from Model 5 suggests that adjustments in Operating Profit increase 
rating, and further that adjustments in Operating Profit are more important in explaining 
ratings relative to adjustments in Total Debt and Interest Expense. Sensitivity tests will further 
include an analysis where Model 1 is estimated separately using data from one reporting 
standard at a time in order to find more evidence of the behaviour of the adjustment variable. 
 
In addition to statistical significance, it seems that financial statement adjustments are also 
economically significant. When considering the size of the coefficients, in Models 2-5 the 
coefficients of US and local GAAP adjustments are greater than 1.
36
 This means that an 
increase of 1 in the adjustment variables leads to a change at least in the relative standing of 
the rating within the main rating category. 
 
As far as company-specific and country-related issues are concerned, a larger size increases 
credit ratings. The larger the size relative to the smallest benchmark group the larger the 
coefficient, and thus the greater the impact on rating. Leverage and operative risk, on the 
other hand, decrease rating. Companies which are the main companies of a corporate group 
have a lower rating relative to companies that are not. Interestingly, those countries that turn 
out to be significant in explaining ratings, have a negative impact on rating. Companies in 
Argentina, Indonesia, Luxembourg, Netherlands and Russia have on average a lower rating 
relative to companies in countries not having a country dummy included in the rating models. 
 
The findings from the analyses support the hypothesis H1 and the evidence suggests that 
financial statement adjustments are associated with credit ratings. All in all, the strongest 
findings in the regression analyses, in statistical terms, are that IFRS companies have higher 
ratings relative to US companies before adjustments are performed and that US adjustments 
increase ratings. Compared to IFRS companies, the financial situation and performance 
                                                 
36
 In Model 1, the coefficient of local GAAP adjustments is also greater than 1. 
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metrics of US companies thus seem relatively less favourable before any adjustments are 
made. Reasons for the relatively worse standing can be found from the extent of leasing 
arrangement in the US as well as from the differences in the pension system. However, 
adjustments increase ratings for US firms and consequently bring IFRS and US companies 
closer to each other. Financial statements become more comparable across companies, which 
in turn decreases the information risk and increases the quality of financial statement 
information. Thus, evidence supports the view that adjustments increase the usefulness of 
information and that they benefit the decision making during the rating process. 
 
As far as local GAAP companies are concerned, adjustments seem to be negatively associated 
with ratings. As local GAAPs are expected to be reporting standards of lower quality relative 
to US GAAP, adjustments do not decrease the information risk enough. This causes the 
decreasing of local GAAP ratings relative to US GAAP. If IFRS and US GAAP companies 
are brought closer to one another, financial statement adjustments do not suffice to take local 
GAAP companies to the same level because of the lower quality standards underlying the 
financial statement information. 
 
6.2.2 Additional Test: Comparing Explanatory Powers Resulting from Reported and 
Adjusted Data  
 
Another way to investigate the quality differences between reported and adjusted data is to 
estimate the rating model without adjustment variables, using 1) reported and 2) adjusted data 
and then comparing the adjusted R
2
s resulting from the two sets of data. The data that yields a 
higher explanatory power better explains ratings and can be considered to be of higher quality 
in terms of credit ratings. The models are estimated using data from 2004-2007. 
 
The model estimated without adjustment variables with reported data is the benchmark model 
(Model 0) illustrated in Table 6. The regression results of the corresponding model estimated 
with adjusted data, on the other hand, are shown in Appendix 11. Adjusted data generates an 
adjusted R
2
 of 0.573 compared to that of 0.532 with reported data. When considering the 
regression results resulting from adjusted data, in addition to size, leverage and operative risk 
control variables, also the profitability variable EBITA/AvAs and the interest coverage ratio 
IntEXP/EBIT are significant, both with a positive effect on rating. Both GROUP and 
PUBLIC are significant, the former with a negative effect and the latter with a positive effect 
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on rating. On the other hand, CVNI is no longer significant. There are slight differences in the 
country dummies that are significant compared to the benchmark model with reported data. 
ARGENTINA, INDONESIA, LUXEMBOURG, NETHERLANDS, PHILIPPINES and 
RUSSIA are all significant with a negative effect. When the model is estimated with adjusted 
data and without GAAP dummies, the adjusted R
2
 equals 0.571. The model estimated with 
reported data and without GAAP dummies, on the other hand, yields an adjusted R
2
 of 0.521, 
as mentioned earlier. Using adjusted data, the same firm-specific variables are significant in 
the model without GAAPs as in the model estimated with GAAP dummies. In addition, 
KOREA and MEXICO are significant and negative whereas PHILLIPPINES is no longer 
significant. 
 
The model estimated with adjusted data, both with and without GAAP dummies, thus results 
in an explanatory power that is higher than that estimated with reported data. The statistical 
significance of the difference between the two adjusted R
2
s will be tested with an F-test. The 
test indicates that the difference in the explanatory power is not statistically significant. Panel 
A in Table 9 illustrates the test result when GAAP dummies are included whereas Panel B 
shows the result when GAAP dummies are not a part of the model. 
 
PANEL A: Rating Models Estimated with GAAPs
Sum of Squares df Sum of Squares df
Residual 2,969.213 415 3,258.065 415
Residual Variance 7.155 7.851
F-Value 1.097
Significance F-Value 0.172
PANEL B: Rating Models Estimated without GAAPs
Sum of Squares df Sum of Squares df
Residual 2,997.522 417 3,349.290 417
Residual Variance 7.188 8.032
F-Value 1.117
Significance F-Value 0.129
Adjusted Data Reported Data
TABLE 9
Statistical Significance between Explanatory Powers
Adjusted Data Reported Data
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6.3 Sensitivity Tests 
 
The empirical part of this thesis ends with sensitivity tests. Firstly, the removed variables 
from the model explaining the amount of adjustments are considered. Secondly, the rating 
model is taken under examination and models from the main analyses are re-estimated with 
slight modifications. 
 
6.3.1 Removed Variables from the Models Explaining the Amount of Adjustments 
 
As mentioned in section 5.2.3 Explaining the Amount of Financial Statement Adjustments, 
five firm-specific control variables were eliminated from the final models because of their low 
t-statistics, and consequently low contribution to the explanatory power of the models. The 
effect of those variables on the amount of adjustments as well as on the entire model is now 
tested. Model 1 explaining SumADJ%TA
37
 is chosen for sensitivity tests. The tested variables 
cover firm-characteristics such as the financing of investments either with equity or with debt, 
corporate governance related dividend decision, maturity structure of debt and interest 
coverage. The regression results are shown in Appendix 12. 
 
Firstly, the variable Common Shares Issued to Total Assets (ComSHARES/TA) is added to 
the model (1). Including the variable in Model 1 increases the adjusted R
2
 to 0.404 and the 
condition index to 19.365. The variable ComSHARES/TA is statistically significant with a 
negative effect on the amount of adjustments. In addition, now CVNI and PUBLIC are 
significant with a negative impact on adjustments. However, INDONESIA is not significant 
anymore. 
 
Secondly, including the variable Long-term Debt Issued to Total Assets (LtDEBT/TA) 
decreases slightly the adjusted R
2
 to 0.398 (2). The condition index of the regression model is 
19.583. The variable LtDEBT/TA is not significant in explaining adjustments. As a result, the 
same variables are significant in the model with the same sign of coefficient as before 
including the variable. 
 
                                                 
37
 Model 1 has an adjusted R
2
 of 0.399 and a condition index of 19.074. 
 86 
Thirdly, Dividends to Total Assets (Div/TA) is included in Model 1 explaining adjustments 
(3). Consequently, the adjusted R
2
 decreases to 0.314 whereas the condition index increases to 
20.169. The variable Div/TA is statistically significant with a negative impact on adjustments. 
However, compared to the model estimated without this variable, DEBT/BCap is not 
significant anymore. Additionally, GROUP is significant with a negative effect whereas 
BRAZIL is significant with a positive effect. KOREA and LUXEMBOURG, 
UNITEDKINGDOM are not significant anymore. THAILAND, that was significant when the 
model was estimated without Div/TA, drops out from the model. Also, the number of 
observations decreases to 394, compared to that of 424 otherwise. 
 
Fourthly, the inclusion of Short-term Debt to Long-term Debt (StDEBT/LtDEBT) does not 
change the adjusted R
2
 which stays at 0.399 (4). The condition index, on the other hand, 
increases to 19.327. The variable StDEBT/LtDEBT is not significant in explaining 
adjustments. The same variables are significant in the regression model with the same sign of 
coefficient as before including the variable. 
 
Finally, the impact of Interest Expense to EBIT (IntEXP/EBIT) on the amount of adjustments 
is examined (5). The adjusted R
2
 decreases slightly to 0.398 while the condition index is 
19.084. The variable IntEXP/EBIT is not significant in explaining adjustments. Relative to 
the model estimated without the variable, KOREA is not significant anymore. 
 
From these five variables considered individually as a part of the original model, the variable 
ComSHARES/TA seems to be important in explaining adjustments. As the coefficient of the 
variable is negative, the larger the amount of common shares issued relative to total assets, the 
smaller the amount of adjustments performed. Thus, in addition to the characteristics 
mentioned in section 6.1 Association between Reporting Standards, Company-specific 
Factors and Financial Statement Adjustments, it seems that the ability to finance investments 
with equity capital decreases the amount of adjustments. This finding is consistent with prior 
evidence that public companies also disclose higher quality information to the markets (for 
instance Burgstahler et al., 2007). As a result, there is less need for adjustments on the behalf 
of credit rating agencies. Moreover, the variable Div/TA is significant as a part of the original 
model with a negative effect on adjustments. However, the inclusion of the variable decreases 
the explanatory power of the model and results in other relevant variables being no longer 
significant. 
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6.3.2 Rating Model Estimated with Scale 1-8 
 
The sensitivity tests include the rating models estimated with a scale including only the main 
rating categories, as in the research of Kaplan and Urwitz (1979) in order to see whether the 
rating scale affects the results of the main analyses. For the sensitivity test, Model 1, 
introduced in section 6.2.1 Adjustment Variables Included in the Credit Rating Model, is 
selected. Furthermore, the benchmark model (Model 0) is re-estimated both with reported and 
adjusted data and the resulting adjusted R
2
s are compared. The regression models are 
illustrated in Appendix 13 and the results of the F-test in Appendix 14. 
 
When Model 1 is re-estimated with a scale from 1 to 8, the resulting adjusted R
2
 is 0.615 and 
the condition index 17.262. SumADJ%TA together with IFRS and LOCALGAAP are 
significant and positive whereas the interaction term for local GAAP adjustments is 
significant and negative, as when the model was estimated with the scale 1-19. However, now 
also CVNI, MEXICO and PHILIPPINES are significant with a negative effect on rating. 
When Model 1 is re-estimated without GAAPs, local GAAP adjustments have a negative 
effect on rating, as when the model was estimated with the scale 1-19. In addition, now CVNI 
is significant with a negative effect. 
 
When models including no adjustment variables are re-estimated using 1) reported and 2) 
adjusted data with the scale 1-8 and the significance of the difference in the explanatory 
power is tested, the results remain unchanged, both with and without GAAP dummies. The 
benchmark model estimated with GAAPs generates an adjusted R
2
 of 0.607 with reported 
data compared to that of 0.633 with adjusted data, whereas the adjusted R
2
s for the models 
estimated without GAAPs are 0.597 and 0.630, respectively. The difference in the 
explanatory power resulting from the two sets of data is not statistically significant. 
 
These sensitivity tests suggest that the results concerning the findings of the main analyses 
remain unchanged when using only the main rating categories for the dependent variable. 
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6.3.3 Sign of Adjustments Included in the Rating Model 
 
The amount of positive and negative adjustments was seen in Table 1. The table illustrated 
that most of the adjustments are positive. Models 2-4 from section 6.2.1 Adjustment Variables 
Included in the Credit Rating Model are now re-estimated with the sign of adjustments. The 
regression results are shown in Appendix 15. The sign of adjustments is taken into account in 
these rating models by constructing a dummy variable for negative adjustments (1). 
Furthermore, the dummy for negative adjustments is multiplied with the corresponding 
adjustment variable (2). Interaction terms, where the dummy variable multiplied with the 
amount of adjustments is multiplied further with IFRS and LOCALGAAP, are also included 
in the models (3). The variables for negative adjustments are the following: 
 
1. Dummy for negative adjustments: 
 
- NegADJOpPROF 
 
- NegADJIntEXP 
 
- NegADJTotDEBT 
 
2. Dummy multiplied with the amount of adjustments: 
 
- NegADJOpPROF*DiffOpPROF%TA 
 
- NegADJIntEXP*DiffIntEXP%TA 
 
- NegADJTotDEBT*DiffTotDEBT%TA 
 
3. Dummy multiplied with the amount of adjustments and with GAAP dummies: 
 
- IFRS*NegADJOpPROF*DiffOpPROF%TA 
 
- LOCALGAAP*NegADJOpPROF*DiffOpPROF%TA 
 
- IFRS*NegADJIntEXP*DiffIntEXP%TA 
 
- LOCALGAAP*NegADJIntEXP*DiffIntEXP%TA 
 
- IFRS*NegADJTotDEBT*DiffTotDEBT%TA 
 
- LOCALGAAP*NegADJTotDEBT*DiffTotDEBT%TA. 
 
Firstly, when considering the re-estimated Model 2 including the adjustments in Operating 
Profit, the adjusted R
2
 is 0.534 while the condition index is 15.601. The variable 
DiffOpPROF%TA is significant with a positive effect and now describes the effect of positive 
US adjustments on rating. Also, IFRS is significant and positive, as previously. Of the 
included variables for negative adjustments, none of them are significant. However, compared 
to the model before including the variables for negative adjustments, CVNI is now significant 
with a negative effect while PHILIPPINES not significant anymore. 
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Secondly, when the sign of Interest Expense adjustments is included in Model 3, major 
multicollinearity problems arise. The condition index is 91.422 while the VIF values of 
NegADJIntEXP*DiffIntEXP%TA and LOCALGAAP*NegADJIntEXP*DiffIntEXP%TA are 
over 500. The correlation between these two terms equals 0.998 with the Pearson‟s 
correlation. This model cannot be analyzed due to multicollinearity problems. 
 
Thirdly, re-estimating Model 4 by including the variables for negative adjustments, results in 
an adjusted R
2
 of 0.540 and a condition index of 17.151. The results concerning the test 
variables remain unchanged compared to Model 4. The variable for positive US adjustments 
together with IFRS and LOCALGAAP are significant, the effect being positive. The effect of 
positive local GAAP adjustments is negative. As seen in Table 1, none of the local GAAP 
Total Debt adjustments are negative. Therefore, the interaction term for negative local GAAP 
adjustments LOCALGAAP*NegADJTotDEBT*DiffTotDEBT%TA drops out from the 
regression model. None of the included variables for negative adjustments are significant. All 
the same control variables are significant with the same sign of coefficient compared to the 
original Model 4. 
 
It can be seen that the inclusion of variables for negative adjustments does not change the 
results of the main analyses concerning the test variables. Negative adjustments do not seem 
to influence ratings. However, as the number of observations of the negative adjustment 
variables is extremely small, the multicollinearity included in the models increases and affects 
the reliability of the results. 
 
6.3.4 Rating Model Estimated Separately for Different Reporting Standards 
 
In order to get a better understanding of the behaviour of the adjustment variables across 
reporting standards, a rating model is estimated using only data from one reporting standard at 
a time. Consequently, three rating models are estimated using companies reporting under 1) 
US GAAP, 2) IFRS and 3) local GAAPs. The adjustment variable used in the model is 
SumADJ%TA. The model does not include GAAP dummies or interaction terms for GAAPs 
and adjustments. The company-specific and country-related variables are the same as used in 
the main analyses. The regression results are found in Appendix 16. 
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Firstly, estimating the model with only US GAAP companies results in an adjusted R
2
 of 
0.641 and a condition index of 13.490. The variable SumADJ%TA is statistically significant 
with a positive effect. Secondly, using IFRS companies yields an adjusted R
2
 of 0.614 while 
the condition index rises to 25.907. The variable SumADJ%TA is positive but not statistically 
significant. Thirdly, using only local GAAP companies generates an adjusted R
2
 of 0.684. 
However, now the condition index increases to 30.291. The variable SumADJ%TA is 
statistically significant with a negative impact on rating. The findings from this additional 
analysis are consistentt with the evidence of the main analyses. First, the adjustments made to 
US GAAP companies increase rating. Second, no evidence is found concerning the 
association between IFRS adjustments and ratings. Third, local GAAP adjustments decrease 
rating. 
 
 
7 CONCLUSIONS 
 
The objective of this thesis is to find an answer to the question of whether financial statement 
adjustments made by a credit rating agency matter in credit analysis. Financial statement 
adjustments can be thought of either as a means to measure the quality of financial statement 
information or as a method to improve the usefulness of information during the rating 
process. 
 
Usefulness is often mentioned as the primary objective for high quality financial statement 
information. Information must provide facts about the firm‟s future prospects as well as 
faithfully represent without bias what it is intended to represent. Increasing the quality of 
financial statement information aims at reducing information asymmetry and thereby 
improving its decision-usefulness for all users. Improving the quality of financial statement 
information has desirable economic consequences. Indeed, prior research shows that 
increasing quality results in decreasing cost of capital, reduced analysts‟ cost of information 
acquisition, improvement in forecast accuracy as well as increasing market liquidity, foreign 
ownership and equity valuation. 
 
When considering determinants underlying the quality of financial statement information, 
academic literature suggests factors such as the quality of accounting standards chosen, legal 
and political systems, development of financial markets, capital structure, ownership structure 
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and tax system that all have an impact on the quality of information. Moreover, the incentives 
of those who prepare and demand financial statement information have a major influence on 
the quality of the outcome. Incentives, on the other hand, are largely affected by legal, 
auditing, governance and regulatory regimes as well as by market forces. Therefore, high 
quality standards do not suffice alone to increase the quality and usefulness of information. 
What is also needed is high quality implementation and enforcement of those standards in 
practice. In the absence of a global enforcement mechanism, as is the case currently for IFRS, 
local political and economic factors continue to influence local financial reporting practice. 
Academics caution that uneven implementation is therefore likely to remain. 
 
This thesis compares the quality of financial statement information according to three 
reporting standard groups. The empirical analyses consider US GAAP as the benchmark 
standards to which IFRS and local GAAPs are compared. Traditionally, US GAAP has been 
thought of as higher quality reporting standards relative to the other standards. Currently 
academic literature suggests that IFRS are of similar quality with US GAAP although 
remaining differences still exist between the two sets of standards. Moreover, some 
researchers have even voiced a concern that harmonizing the two sets of standards would not 
benefit the quality of information. Instead, competition should be encouraged between IFRS 
and US GAAP. As far as local reporting standards are concerned, prior evidence shows that 
they are of lower quality relative to the two other sets of standards. 
 
Regarding the context of credit ratings, prior research shows that the quality of financial 
statement information is an important determinant affecting credit ratings. Increased earnings 
management leads to the credit rating agencies discounting the reported financial statement 
information and assigning a lower rating as a result. Today, a bit more than a year after the 
world-wide credit crunch, it is easy to agree with the importance of high quality financial 
statement information as a part of a credit analysis. 
 
The first part of the empirical analyses aims at providing descriptive evidence on factors 
associated with financial statement adjustments. Evidence indicates that different reporting 
standards do not explain the differences in the amount of adjustments between different 
companies. On the other hand, capital intensity, operative risk and leverage are positively 
associated with financial statement adjustments. Therefore, the more capital intensive, the 
riskier or the more levered the company, the greater the amount of adjustments. Also, it seems 
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that public companies face fewer adjustments relative to private companies. The findings are 
consistent with earnings management literature which suggests that increased risk and 
leverage may cause companies to manage earnings, as well as that the earnings of public 
companies are more informative relative to private companies. Capital intensity, on the other 
hand, is an important characteristic relating to telecommunication companies. All in all, the 
ultimate underlying reason for financial statement adjustments seems to be company-specific 
decisions on how to finance investments and pensions. Thus, the financing and capital 
structure as well as contractual decisions matter and influence the amount of adjustments.  
 
However, in the future it would be interesting to investigate whether the findings remain 
unchanged when financial statement adjustments are compared across several industries. 
Indeed, the mentioned company-specific characteristics are all strongly related to the 
telecommunications industry. Telecommunication companies are characterized by high 
capital intensity, and as large investments must be financed at least to some extent with debt, 
the companies have to deal with leverage. In addition, high operative risk relates inseparably 
to the industry as telecommunication companies face considerable fixed costs and as the asset 
life cycles are short when trends change fast. Therefore, it might be that these characteristics 
are important industry-related determinants for adjustments. For this reason, it would be 
worthwhile to examine whether the findings hold with a cross-industry sample. 
 
The second part of the empirical analyses examines the research hypothesis. The objective is 
to find evidence of whether financial statement adjustments are associated with credit ratings. 
Evidence shows that US adjustments increase credit ratings. Additionally, the results indicate 
that, without any adjustments, credit ratings are higher for companies reporting under IFRS 
relative to companies reporting under US GAAP. To begin with, the financial situation of US 
companies seems less favourable before any adjustments are made. However, adjustments 
increase ratings for US firms and thus bring IFRS and US companies closer to each other. 
Financial statements become more comparable across companies, which in turn decreases the 
information risk and increases the quality of financial statement information. Therefore, 
evidence supports the view that adjustments increase the usefulness of information and that 
they are made in order to benefit the decision making during the rating process. 
 
However, as far as local GAAP companies are concerned, adjustments decrease ratings 
relative to US ratings. As local GAAPs are expected to be reporting standards of lower quality 
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relative to US GAAP, the effect of adjustments under a local GAAP is smaller and 
adjustments do not decrease the information risk enough. Financial statement adjustments do 
not suffice to take local GAAP companies to the same level with US GAAP and IFRS 
companies because of the lower quality standards underlying the financial statement 
information. 
 
On the basis of these findings, financial statement adjustments do matter in credit analysis. In 
short, they increase the comparability of information across companies and make information 
more decision-useful for the rating process. On the other hand, the circumstances underlying 
adjustments are company-specific. Financial statement adjustments seem to be affected 
largely by financing and contractual decisions. 
 
At the beginning of the thesis it was suggested that the amount of adjustments having a 
negative association with credit ratings can be seen as a measure of financial statement 
information quality. The evidence of this thesis does not support this view but finds instead 
that adjustments increase ratings, consistent with the decision-usefulness point of view. 
However, in the future a possible research topic would be to investigate how a quality 
measure based on adjustments compares with the other more traditional quality metrics. 
Moreover, as adjustments consist of standard and non-standard adjustments, it would be 
worthwhile to separate these two dimensions and investigate their effect on rating separately. 
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APPENDICES 
 
GAAP Country Company GAAP Country Company
US GAAP BERMUDA 1 IFRS AUSTRALIA 1
CANADA 2 AUSTRIA 1
CHILE 1 BELGIUM 1
GREECE 1 CAYMAN ISLANDS 1
INDIA 2 CHINA 1
ISRAEL 1 DENMARK 2
JAPAN 2 EGYPT 1
PUERTO RICO 1 FINLAND 1
RUSSIA 7 FRANCE 3
TAIWAN 1 GERMANY 2
UKRAINE 1 HONG KONG 3
UNITED STATES 64 HUNGARY 1
Total 84 INDIA 1
IRELAND 1
Local GAAPs ITALY 2
Argentine GAAP ARGENTINA 3 KUWAIT 1
Australian GAAP AUSTRALIA 1 LITHUANIA 1
Brazilian GAAP BRAZIL 7 LUXEMBOURG 3
Canadian GAAP CANADA 7 NETHERLANDS 2
Chilean GAAP CHILE 1 NEW ZEALAND 1
Chinese GAAP TAIWAN 1 NORWAY 1
Hong Kong GAAP CHINA 1 PAKISTAN 1
HONG KONG 1 PHILIPPINES 2
Indian GAAP INDIA 3 POLAND 1
Indonesian GAAP INDONESIA 6 PORTUGAL 1
Israeli GAAP ISRAEL 1 RUSSIA 1
Japanese GAAP JAPAN 2 SINGAPORE 1
Korean GAAP KOREA 5 SLOVENIA 1
Malaysian GAAP MALAYSIA 2 SOUTH AFRICA 2
Mexican GAAP MEXICO 5 SPAIN 1
Philippine GAAP PHILIPPINES 1 SWEDEN 2
Russian GAAP RUSSIA 1 SWITZERLAND 1
Singapore GAAP SINGAPORE 1 TURKEY 1
Sri Lanka GAAP SRI LANKA 1 UNITED ARAB EMIRATES 1
Thai GAAP THAILAND 5 UNITED KINGDOM 5
Total 55 Total 52
TOTAL NUMBER OF COMPANIES 191
APPENDIX 1
Distribution of Countries Relative to Reporting Standard
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Financial Statement Item N Mean Median STD Z
Cash & Cash Equivalents 457 0.002 0.000 0.013 -4.883 *
Short-term Investments 457 -0.002 0.000 0.014 -5.098 *
Deposits 323 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.135  
Restricted Cash 287 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
Accounts Receivable - Trade (net) 457 0.001 0.000 0.006 -3.180 *
Accounts Receivable - Other 419 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
Unbilled Revenues / Accrued Receivables 19 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
Inventories 457 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
Deferred Tax Asset - Current 181 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
Other Current Assets 457 0.000 0.000 0.001 -2.165 *
Discontinued Operations 12 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
CURRENT ASSETS 457 0.001 0.000 0.009 -1.982 *
Investment in Subsidiaries / Affiliates 457 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
Loans / Advances to Subsidiaries / Affiliates 305 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
Other Investments 457 -0.001 0.000 0.012 -4.286 *
Gross Plant 457 0.088 0.065 0.080 -18.172 *
Less: Accumulated Depreciation 455 0.001 0.000 0.010 -2.666 *
Net Property Plant and Equipment 457 0.087 0.065 0.078 -18.172 *
Goodwill 304 0.000 0.000 0.000 -1.342  
Intangibles - Other 444 0.000 0.000 0.003 -0.784  
Deferred Tax Asset - Non-Current 433 0.000 0.000 0.002 -5.333 *
Other Assets 457 -0.001 0.000 0.007 -4.820 *
Discontinued Operations - Non-Current Assets 9 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
Assets in Disposal Groups Held for Sale 36 0.000 0.000 0.000 -1.342  
TOTAL ASSETS 457 0.085 0.065 0.080 -17.787 *
*. Z is significant at the 0.05 level.
APPENDIX 2
Descriptive Statistics of the Amount of Adjustments Relating to Balance Sheet Items
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Financial Statement Item N Mean Median STD Z
Short-term Debt 457 0.001 0.000 0.005 -4.452 *
Current Portion of Long-term Debt 457 0.006 0.004 0.007 -17.026 *
Accounts Payable - Trade 457 0.000 0.000 0.001 -1.342  
Accounts Payable - Other 453 0.000 0.000 0.001 -1.483  
Accruals 449 0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.169  
Income Taxes 449 0.000 0.000 0.002 -2.803 *
Deferred Income - Current 413 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
Deferred Tax Liability - Current 43 0.000 0.000 0.001 -1.000  
Due to Affiliates - Current 24 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
Other Current Liabilities 457 -0.001 0.000 0.006 -4.039 *
CURRENT LIABILITIES 457 0.006 0.004 0.011 -15.274 *
Equipment Trust 287 0.000 0.000 0.002 -1.342  
Secured Debt 330 0.001 0.000 0.010 -2.599 *
Senior Debt 455 0.010 0.000 0.026 -11.190 *
Subordinated Debt 311 0.008 0.000 0.052 -4.625 *
Mandatorily Redeemable Preferred Securities 14 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
Capitalized Leases 456 0.088 0.066 0.078 -18.135 *
Long-term Debt - Gross 457 0.104 0.086 0.093 -18.173 *
Less: Current Maturities 457 -0.006 -0.004 0.007 -17.026 *
Net Long-term Debt 457 0.098 0.080 0.090 -18.110 *
Total Loans / Advances from Subsidiaries / Affiliates 287 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
Deferred Income Taxes - Non-current 438 -0.002 0.000 0.006 -9.582 *
Investment Tax Credit 287 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
Unfunded Accumulated Pension Benefit Obligations 295 -0.004 0.000 0.016 -5.579 *
Other Accumulated Post-retirement Benefit Obligations 20 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
Other Long-term Liabilities 457 -0.005 0.000 0.014 -10.113 *
Deferred Income - Non-current 49 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
Minority Interest 422 -0.001 0.000 0.009 -3.621 *
Liabilities in Disposal Groups Held for Sale 13 -0.001 0.000 0.001 -1.604  
TOTAL LIABILITIES 457 0.094 0.072 0.092 -17.884 *
Preferred Stock 319 0.001 0.000 0.051 -1.163  
Common Stock & Paid-in-capital 457 0.000 0.000 0.010 -1.957 *
Total Retained Earnings 456 -0.008 0.000 0.080 -9.568 *
Accumulated Other Comprehensive Income 353 -0.002 0.000 0.009 -6.006 *
TOTAL EQUITY 457 -0.008 0.000 0.044 -9.772 *
TOTAL LIABILITIES & EQUITY 457 0.085 0.065 0.080 -17.787 *
*. Z is significant at the 0.05 level.
APPENDIX 2 (Continued)
Descriptive Statistics of the Amount of Adjustments Relating to Balance Sheet Items
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Financial Statement Item N Mean Median STD Z
Revenues 457 0.000 0.000 0.002 -2.521 *
Cost of Goods / Products / Services Sold 457 -0.011 0.000 0.037 -10.013 *
GROSS PROFIT 457 0.010 0.000 0.037 -8.985 *
Operating Expenses 453 -0.007 -0.005 0.013 -14.723 *
Selling, General and Administrative Expenses 457 -0.006 -0.004 0.008 -15.562 *
Depreciation 451 0.006 0.000 0.024 -3.760 *
Depreciation - Capitalized Operating Leases 430 0.012 0.008 0.010 -17.969 *
Amortization of Intangibles 457 0.001 0.000 0.012 -5.324 *
Depreciation & Amortization 449 0.007 0.000 0.029 -4.599 *
Unusual Expense (Gains) 287 -0.005 0.000 0.052 -5.024 *
OPERATING PROFITS 457 0.008 0.004 0.044 -12.742 *
Other Expenses 174 -0.003 0.000 0.008 -6.359 *
Equity Income (Before Income Tax Expense) 457 -0.001 0.000 0.005 -7.605 *
Minority Interest Expense 25 -0.003 0.000 0.007 -2.982 *
Other Income 457 -0.002 0.000 0.008 -8.948 *
Other Expense / Income 295 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
Other Gains & Losses 76 -0.002 0.000 0.010 -1.005  
Interest Expense 457 0.006 0.005 0.010 -16.546 *
Unusual Items - Expenses / Gains 295 0.005 0.000 0.074 -1.531  
Other Non-Recurring Expenses / Gains 272 0.002 0.000 0.034 -0.610  
PRETAX INCOME 457 -0.005 -0.001 0.082 -7.436 *
Taxes 456 -0.002 0.000 0.026 -8.312 *
Equity Income (After Income Tax Expense) 457 0.001 0.000 0.005 -6.409 *
Net Income Before Minority Interests 295 -0.004 -0.001 0.071 -4.662 *
Minority Interest Expense (After Tax) 417 0.000 0.000 0.001 -1.826  
Net Profit After Tax Before Unusual Items 457 -0.002 -0.001 0.059 -6.074 *
Extraordinary Items -Gains / Expense 307 -0.001 0.000 0.008 -2.666 *
Income (Loss) from Discontinued Operations 79 0.000 0.000 0.002 -1.342  
Cumulative Effect of Changes in Accouting Principles 10 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
NET INCOME 457 -0.003 -0.001 0.059 -6.635 *
Unusual & Non-recurring Items - Adjusted After Tax 400 0.001 0.001 0.039 -6.177 *
NET INCOME AFTER ADJUSTED FOR UNUSUAL & NON-
RECURRING ITEMS 457 0.000 0.000 0.004 -2.214 *
*. Z is significant at the 0.05 level.
APPENDIX 3
Descriptive Statistics of the Amount of Adjustments Relating to Income Statement and Cash Flow Statement Items
 
 
 105 
Financial Statement Item N Mean Median STD Z
Preferred Dividends Declared 449 0.000 0.000 0.004 -2.214 *
Income Available to Common Shareholders 457 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
Common Dividends Declared 233 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
Comprehensive Income 287 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
Average Common Shares Outstanding 172 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
Earnings per Share 287 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
Deferred Income Taxes 373 0.000 0.000 0.001 -8.029 *
Minority Interest 327 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
Undistributed Equity Earnings 449 0.000 0.000 0.000 -1.000  
Other Non-cash Items 457 0.000 0.000 0.002 -1.849  
Other Operating Cash Flow 457 0.000 0.000 0.007 -0.282  
Discontinued Operations 48 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
Funds from Operations 457 0.010 0.008 0.017 -14.469 *
Changes in Working Capital Items 457 0.000 0.000 0.004 -0.809  
Changes in Other Operating Assets & Liablities - Short-term 402 0.001 0.000 0.006 -2.116 *
Changes in Other Operating Assets & Liabilities - Long-term 449 0.001 0.000 0.004 -6.964 *
CASH FLOW FROM OPERATIONS 457 0.011 0.009 0.017 -14.847 *
Unusual & Non-recurring Items - Cash Flow Adjustments 44 -0.002 -0.002 0.021 -2.415 *
CASH FLOW FROM OPERATIONS After Unusual & Non-
recurring Adjustments 457 0.011 0.008 0.016 -15.090 *
Additions to PP&E (Capital Expenditures) 457 -0.010 -0.008 0.011 -17.341 *
Proceeds from Disposal of PP&E 457 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
Business Acquisition 457 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
Proceeds from Business Divestitures 365 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
Acquisitions - Net 287 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
Liquidation of Restricted Cash / Investments in - Net 30 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
Sale of Investment Securities 295 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
Purchase of Investment Securities 295 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
Net Sales / Purchases of Investment Securities 295 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
Other Investment Activities 457 -0.001 0.000 0.004 -6.886 *
Investing Activities of Discontinued Operations 10 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
NET CASH FROM INVESTING ACTIVITIES 457 -0.011 -0.008 0.012 -17.471 *
*. Z is significant at the 0.05 level.
APPENDIX 3 (Continued)
Descriptive Statistics of the Amount of Adjustments Relating to Income Statement and Cash Flow Statement Items
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Financial Statement Item N Mean Median STD Z
Long-term Debt Proceeds 457 0.011 0.008 0.010 -18.114 *
Long-term Debt Payments 457 -0.011 -0.008 0.010 -18.002 *
Long-term Debt Proceeds / Repayment - Net 449 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
Net Short-term Debt Changes 457 0.000 0.000 0.003 -1.083  
Other Financing Activities - Net 390 -0.002 0.000 0.016 -8.054 *
Common Stock Issued / Repurchased 457 0.000 0.000 0.006 -1.604  
Capital Contribution from Parent 7 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
Preferred Stock Issued / Repurchased 292 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
Treasury Stock Issued / Repurchased 332 0.000 0.000 0.006 -1.342  
Stock Options / Warrants - Net - Including Rights 66 0.000 0.000 0.000 -1.859  
Subsidiary / Minority Issued Stock 295 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
Cash Dividends - Common 418 0.000 0.000 0.013 -0.711  
Cash Dividends - Preferred 51 0.003 0.000 0.012 -2.214 *
Cash Dividends - Minority 348 0.001 0.000 0.015 -2.366 *
Interest Paid 33 0.021 0.022 0.013 -5.012 *
Financing Activity from Discontinued Operations 13 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
NET CASH FROM FINANCING ACTIVITIES 457 0.001 0.000 0.012 -0.401  
NET INCREASE (DECREASE) IN CASH & EQUIVALENT 457 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
Total Debt 457 0.105 0.086 0.093 -18.176 *
Secured Debt + Equipment Trust 330 0.002 0.000 0.010 -2.903 *
Net Debt 457 0.103 0.083 0.094 -18.105 *
EBITA 457 0.002 0.003 0.085 -5.311 *
Average Assets 457 0.082 0.059 0.079 -17.804 *
EBIT 457 0.003 0.003 0.086 -6.100 *
EBITDA 457 0.012 0.011 0.085 -13.031 *
Market Capitalization 299 0.085 0.074 0.063 -14.368 *
Book Capitalization 457 0.094 0.074 0.082 -17.915 *
Retained Cash Flow 457 0.011 0.008 0.022 -14.890 *
Free Cash Flow 457 0.002 0.000 0.020 -4.582 *
Dividends 423 -0.002 0.000 0.019 -2.431 *
Market Value 299 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
*. Z is significant at the 0.05 level.
APPENDIX 3 (Continued)
Descriptive Statistics of the Amount of Adjustments Relating to Income Statement and Cash Flow Statement Items
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Variable Coef. t-value Prob.
Intercept 0.524 25.880 0.000
IFRS 0.023 2.145 0.033
LOCALGAAP 0.004 0.320 0.749
SIZE1 -0.033 -2.478 0.014
SIZE2 -0.027 -1.854 0.064
SIZE3 -0.035 -2.386 0.017
SIZE4 -0.008 -0.513 0.609
ProfMRG -0.035 -1.236 0.217
AsTRNV -0.011 -0.696 0.487
ChgREV -0.026 -1.478 0.140
CVNI 0.002 1.373 0.171
NegOpPROF -0.015 -1.052 0.293
DEBT/BCap 0.009 1.148 0.252
QckRATIO -0.014 -1.674 0.095
PUBLIC 0.006 0.613 0.540
GROUP -0.037 -2.762 0.006
ARGENTINA -0.395 -11.113 0.000
BRAZIL 0.038 1.691 0.092
HONGKONG 0.008 0.249 0.803
INDONESIA 0.001 0.058 0.954
JAPAN -0.024 -1.172 0.242
KOREA -0.102 -3.973 0.000
LUXEMBOURG 0.049 1.748 0.081
MEXICO 0.032 1.445 0.149
PHILIPPINES 0.009 0.282 0.778
THAILAND -0.027 -0.857 0.392
UNITEDKINGDOM 0.071 2.789 0.006
YEAR2005 0.005 0.467 0.641
YEAR2006 -0.005 -0.512 0.609
YEAR2007 -0.011 -1.058 0.291
Adjusted R-Squared 0.357
Durbin-Watson Statistic 1.847
Model F-Value 9.093
Significance F-Value 0.000
N 424
CI 19.074
APPENDIX 7
Association between Reporting Standards, Company-specific Factors and Financial Statement Adjustments
(The Relative Number of Adjusted Financial Statement Items)
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Variable Coef. t-value Prob. Coef. t-value Prob.
Intercept 12.087 18.441 0.000 12.626 18.994 0.000
Test Variables
DiffOpPROF%TA 8.324 2.192 0.029 9.943 2.636 0.009
DiffIntEXP%TA 2.508 0.089 0.929 11.671 0.420 0.674
DiffTotDEBT%TA 3.266 1.208 0.228 2.706 1.019 0.309
IFRS 1.393 3.336 0.001
LOCALGAAP -0.056 -0.109 0.913
Control Variables
SIZE1 0.269 0.523 0.601 0.194 0.382 0.703
SIZE2 1.893 3.552 0.000 1.813 3.436 0.001
SIZE3 2.694 5.045 0.000 2.598 4.948 0.000
SIZE4 4.123 7.945 0.000 4.136 8.164 0.000
EBITA/AvAs 3.867 2.145 0.033 3.892 2.191 0.029
IntEXP/EBIT 0.015 0.657 0.511 0.013 0.585 0.559
DEBT/BCap -1.324 -6.304 0.000 -2.385 -7.741 0.000
CVNI -0.008 -1.803 0.072 -0.006 -1.287 0.199
NegOpPROF -3.617 -6.358 0.000 -3.446 -6.156 0.000
GROUP -3.741 -7.151 0.000 -3.289 -6.593 0.000
PUBLIC 0.569 1.469 0.143 0.624 1.635 0.103
ARGENTINA -2.983 -2.121 0.034 -3.643 -2.792 0.005
BRAZIL 0.266 0.275 0.783 -0.617 -0.710 0.478
CHILE 2.755 2.565 0.011 2.000 1.917 0.056
HONGKONG 0.139 0.123 0.902 0.578 0.529 0.597
INDONESIA -2.718 -2.987 0.003 -3.378 -4.370 0.000
JAPAN 1.917 2.463 0.014 1.187 1.608 0.109
KOREA -0.824 -0.806 0.421 -1.563 -1.707 0.089
LUXEMBOURG -4.230 -4.091 0.000 -3.105 -3.178 0.002
MEXICO -0.518 -0.611 0.541 -1.256 -1.748 0.081
NETHERLANDS -4.444 -3.911 0.000 -3.258 -3.011 0.003
PHILIPPINES -1.985 -1.846 0.066 -1.197 -1.162 0.246
RUSSIA -2.606 -4.122 0.000 -3.142 -5.059 0.000
THAILAND -0.177 -0.142 0.887 -0.607 -0.529 0.597
UNITEDKINGDOM -1.383 -1.543 0.124 -0.402 -0.482 0.630
YEAR2005 -0.379 -0.994 0.321 -0.215 -0.569 0.570
YEAR2006 -0.386 -1.016 0.310 -0.214 -0.569 0.570
YEAR2007 -0.527 -1.373 0.170 -0.364 -0.957 0.339
Adjusted R-Squared 0.538 0.545
Durbin-Watson Statistic 2.026 1.955
Model F-Value 16.696 18.127
Significance F-Value 0.000 0.000
N 446 445
CI 16.129 15.746
With GAAPs Without GAAPs
APPENDIX 9
Association between Financial Statement Adjustments and Credit Ratings (3 Adjustment Variables Included)
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Variable Coef. t-value Prob. Coef. t-value Prob. Coef. t-value Prob. Coef. t-value Prob.
Intercept 8.923 5.024 0.000 12.236 9.114 0.000 11.972 9.308 0.000 11.433 8.898 0.000
Test Variables
CountADJ%TA 7.378 2.216 0.027 0.648 0.279 0.780 1.165 0.529 0.597 1.849 0.839 0.402
IFRS*CountADJ%TA -3.076 -0.625 0.532 2.707 3.028 0.003
LOCALGAAP*CountADJ%TA -18.912 -4.118 0.000 -0.920 -0.834 0.405
IFRS 2.697 1.159 0.247 1.367 3.226 0.001
LOCALGAAP 8.661 4.041 0.000 0.044 0.085 0.932
Control Variables
SIZE1 0.287 0.565 0.572 0.352 0.682 0.496 0.369 0.715 0.475 0.447 0.857 0.392
SIZE2 2.096 3.962 0.000 1.918 3.583 0.000 1.876 3.499 0.001 2.030 3.761 0.000
SIZE3 2.689 5.084 0.000 2.682 4.986 0.000 2.630 4.887 0.000 2.902 5.437 0.000
SIZE4 4.129 8.102 0.000 4.174 8.075 0.000 4.172 8.084 0.000 4.533 8.920 0.000
EBITA/AvAs 2.831 1.680 0.094 2.855 1.670 0.096 2.788 1.625 0.105 3.585 2.087 0.037
IntEXP/EBIT 0.027 1.167 0.244 0.016 0.680 0.497 0.015 0.639 0.523 0.011 0.467 0.641
DEBT/BCap -1.195 -6.112 0.000 -1.179 -5.973 0.000 -1.155 -5.837 0.000 -1.181 -5.916 0.000
CVNI -0.009 -1.956 0.051 -0.009 -1.934 0.054 -0.009 -1.956 0.051 -0.007 -1.510 0.132
NegOpPROF -3.117 -5.649 0.000 -3.262 -5.840 0.000 -3.245 -5.791 0.000 -3.217 -5.705 0.000
GROUP -3.433 -6.532 0.000 -3.687 -6.952 0.000 -3.816 -7.235 0.000 -3.489 -6.816 0.000
PUBLIC 0.360 0.946 0.345 0.499 1.297 0.195 0.559 1.457 0.146 0.641 1.658 0.098
ARGENTINA -7.923 -3.875 0.000 -3.233 -2.023 0.044 -3.077 -1.846 0.066 -3.055 -1.919 0.056
BRAZIL 0.717 0.829 0.408 0.844 0.962 0.336 0.490 0.557 0.578 -0.013 -0.016 0.987
CHILE 1.458 1.148 0.252 2.550 2.161 0.031 2.675 2.240 0.026 2.524 2.132 0.034
HONGKONG 0.036 0.033 0.974 -0.015 -0.013 0.990 -0.042 -0.037 0.970 0.814 0.727 0.468
INDONESIA -2.845 -3.186 0.002 -2.444 -2.737 0.006 -2.806 -3.104 0.002 -3.175 -4.039 0.000
JAPAN 2.032 2.615 0.009 1.926 2.452 0.015 1.805 2.291 0.022 1.256 1.640 0.102
KOREA -1.682 -1.545 0.123 -0.256 -0.251 0.802 -0.496 -0.468 0.640 -0.815 -0.850 0.396
LUXEMBOURG -4.291 -4.167 0.000 -4.174 -4.003 0.000 -4.071 -3.923 0.000 -3.073 -3.059 0.002
MEXICO -0.233 -0.278 0.781 -0.311 -0.365 0.715 -0.733 -0.866 0.387 -1.172 -1.590 0.113
NETHERLANDS -4.452 -3.950 0.000 -4.549 -3.971 0.000 -4.528 -3.958 0.000 -3.510 -3.150 0.002
PHILIPPINES -1.998 -1.882 0.061 -1.977 -1.832 0.068 -1.995 -1.844 0.066 -1.089 -1.029 0.304
RUSSIA -2.168 -3.351 0.001 -2.575 -4.078 0.000 -2.474 -3.890 0.000 -2.717 -4.261 0.000
THAILAND -1.185 -0.965 0.335 -0.292 -0.240 0.810 -0.562 -0.455 0.649 -0.803 -0.684 0.494
UNITEDKINGDOM -1.012 -1.135 0.257 -0.990 -1.106 0.270 -0.868 -0.981 0.327 0.091 0.107 0.915
YEAR2005 -0.392 -1.038 0.300 -0.372 -0.971 0.332 -0.349 -0.910 0.363 -0.337 -0.870 0.385
YEAR2006 -0.298 -0.793 0.428 -0.337 -0.886 0.376 -0.314 -0.823 0.411 -0.305 -0.792 0.429
YEAR2007 -0.471 -1.241 0.215 -0.476 -1.235 0.218 -0.457 -1.183 0.237 -0.419 -1.073 0.284
Adjusted R-Squared 0.548 0.533 0.531 0.521
Durbin-Watson Statistic 1.952 2.024 2.027 1.964
Model F-Value 17.367 17.356 17.243 17.659
Significance F-Value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 446 446 446 446
CI 61.874 34.873 33.099 31.220
APPENDIX 10
Association between Financial Statement Adjustments and Credit Ratings (the Relative Number of Adjustmens Included)
( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 ) ( 4 )
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Variable Coef. t-value Prob. Coef. t-value Prob.
Intercept 14.003 20.486 0.000 13.969 20.398 0.000
Test Variables
IFRS 0.790 1.885 0.060
LOCALGAAP -0.045 -0.092 0.927
Control Variables
SIZE1 0.253 0.511 0.609 0.232 0.468 0.640
SIZE2 1.463 2.867 0.004 1.520 2.978 0.003
SIZE3 1.949 3.828 0.000 2.038 4.034 0.000
SIZE4 3.482 7.035 0.000 3.655 7.523 0.000
EBITA/AvAs 7.129 3.372 0.001 7.844 3.758 0.000
IntEXP/EBIT 0.047 2.061 0.040 0.048 2.104 0.036
DEBT/BCap -3.914 -9.089 0.000 -4.011 -9.371 0.000
CVNI -0.035 -0.595 0.552 -0.070 -1.243 0.214
NegOpPROF -2.072 -3.471 0.001 -2.055 -3.442 0.001
GROUP -3.612 -7.200 0.000 -3.453 -7.126 0.000
PUBLIC 0.749 2.059 0.040 0.811 2.238 0.026
ARGENTINA -4.236 -3.212 0.001 -4.434 -3.555 0.000
BRAZIL 0.128 0.152 0.879 -0.229 -0.307 0.759
CHILE 1.578 1.531 0.126 1.395 1.373 0.170
HONGKONG -1.087 -0.990 0.323 -0.687 -0.635 0.526
INDONESIA -4.283 -4.786 0.000 -4.620 -5.917 0.000
JAPAN 1.395 1.855 0.064 1.038 1.434 0.152
KOREA -1.503 -1.586 0.113 -1.809 -2.138 0.033
LUXEMBOURG -3.471 -3.488 0.001 -2.881 -3.029 0.003
MEXICO -1.255 -1.551 0.122 -1.595 -2.289 0.023
NETHERLANDS -3.569 -3.106 0.002 -2.805 -2.590 0.010
PHILIPPINES -2.429 -2.343 0.020 -1.939 -1.922 0.055
RUSSIA -3.706 -5.574 0.000 -4.019 -6.236 0.000
THAILAND -1.094 -0.852 0.395 -1.314 -1.080 0.281
UNITEDKINGDOM -1.429 -1.779 0.076 -0.826 -1.109 0.268
YEAR2005 -0.202 -0.553 0.580 -0.193 -0.528 0.598
YEAR2006 -0.075 -0.205 0.837 -0.063 -0.173 0.863
YEAR2007 -0.311 -0.845 0.399 -0.288 -0.780 0.436
Adjusted R-Squared 0.573 0.571
Durbin-Watson Statistic 1.865 1.845
Model F-Value 20.921 22.170
Significance F-Value 0.000 0.000
N 446 446
CI 16.244 15.437
With GAAPs Without GAAPs
APPENDIX 11
Benchmark Credit Rating Model Estimated with Adjusted Data
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PANEL A: Rating Models Estimated with GAAPs
Sum of Squares df Sum of Squares df
Residual 256.615 414 272.306 413
Residual Variance 0.620 0.659
F-Value 1.064
Significance F-Value 0.265
PANEL B: Rating Models Estimated without GAAPs
Sum of Squares df Sum of Squares df
Residual 259.713 416 280.467 415
Residual Variance 0.624 0.676
F-Value 1.083
Significance F-Value 0.210
Adjusted Data Reported Data
APPENDIX 14
Statistical Significance between Explanatory Powers
Adjusted Data Reported Data
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Variable Coef. t-value Prob. Coef. t-value Prob. Coef. t-value Prob.
Intercept 15.674 17.913 0.000 8.270 4.581 0.000 13.188 7.247 0.000
Test Variable
SumADJ%TA 0.595 2.516 0.013 0.015 0.049 0.961 -2.076 -4.046 0.000
Control Variables
SIZE1 -0.379 -0.643 0.521 0.561 0.364 0.716 2.412 2.276 0.025
SIZE2 0.952 1.433 0.153 0.588 0.413 0.681 2.224 2.052 0.043
SIZE3 1.148 1.675 0.096 0.895 0.633 0.528 2.591 2.229 0.028
SIZE4 1.262 1.661 0.098 2.886 2.219 0.029 4.337 3.774 0.000
EBITA/AvAs -6.371 -2.677 0.008 11.750 2.697 0.008 3.684 1.022 0.310
IntEXP/EBIT -0.241 -2.073 0.040 0.022 0.082 0.935 0.015 0.757 0.451
DEBT/BCap -3.356 -7.067 0.000 -0.870 -3.047 0.003 -0.785 -0.439 0.661
CVNI 0.017 0.135 0.893 -0.003 -0.737 0.463 -0.335 -4.580 0.000
NegOpPROF -4.371 -5.150 0.000 -2.136 -1.800 0.075 -0.118 -0.070 0.944
GROUP -4.407 -6.630 0.000 0.166 0.109 0.913 -0.448 -0.343 0.733
PUBLIC 0.655 1.140 0.256 1.916 2.034 0.044 -0.144 -0.264 0.792
ARGENTINA -8.394 -5.580 0.000
BRAZIL -0.109 -0.147 0.883
CHILE 1.848 1.195 0.234 -1.983 -1.300 0.197
HONGKONG -0.737 -0.641 0.523
INDONESIA -5.158 -5.052 0.000
JAPAN 5.508 4.922 0.000 -3.197 -3.371 0.001
KOREA -0.155 -0.179 0.859
LUXEMBOURG -4.019 -3.507 0.001
MEXICO -2.814 -2.333 0.022 -2.050 -2.703 0.008
NETHERLANDS
PHILIPPINES -3.039 -2.846 0.005
RUSSIA -1.575 -2.112 0.036 -3.690 -2.366 0.020 -3.856 -2.052 0.043
THAILAND -5.622 -3.880 0.000
UNITEDKINGDOM -0.523 -0.567 0.572
YEAR2005 -0.683 -1.289 0.199 0.230 0.349 0.728 0.389 0.690 0.492
YEAR2006 0.021 0.038 0.969 -0.028 -0.043 0.966 -0.712 -1.277 0.205
YEAR2007 -0.182 -0.332 0.740 -0.438 -0.671 0.503 -1.188 -2.093 0.039
Adjusted R-Squared 0.641 0.614 0.684
Durbin-Watson Statistic 2.163 2.267 1.775
Model F-Value 21.126 10.628 11.209
Significance F-Value 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 204 128 114
CI 13.490 25.907 30.291
US GAAP IFRS LOCAL
APPENDIX 16
Association between Financial Statement Adjustments and Credit Ratings (Separately for Different Reporting Standards)
 
